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I. ASSAULT AND BATTERY
Faced with unambiguous facts set in the context of a statute
requiring that a teacher assume authority for the control of pupils
assigned to him and keep good order in his classroom,' the District
Court of Appeal, First District, was called upon in Williams v.
Cotton' to decide whether "[s]imple negligence and intentional
torts, such as assault and battery, are mutually exclusive causes of
action, and [whether] evidence of assault and battery is fatal to an
action based exclusively on simple negligence." 3
In Williams, an action was brought on behalf of an injured
pupil against his teacher for injuries sustained as a result of a physi-
cal confrontation after the teacher attempted to restore order in his
classroom. During the day in question, the plaintiff, a sixteen year
old mentally retarded student, was emotionally upset and behaved
in a manner disturbing to other students. After repeated requests
that the plaintiff "quiet down and take his seat," an altercation
ensued.'
The First District held that the defendant was guilty of negli-
gence rather than the intentional torts of assault and battery. In
support of its result, the court construed section 232.27 of the Flor-
ida Statutes (1975) as necessarily implying the power to use reason-
able physical force, not amounting to corporal punishment, to effect
the statutory requirement of classroom order.' In addition, the court
stated that without such an implication, the purport of the statute
would be rendered nugatory.
1. FLA. STAT. § 232.27 (1975) (current version at FLA. STAT. §§ 232.27, .275 (1977)). The
law restricted the manner in which a teacher may control his pupils and keep good order in
the classroom by stating that a teacher "shall not inflict corporal punishment before consult-
ing the principal or teacher in charge of the school, and in no case shall such punishment be
degrading or unduly severe in its nature." Id. § 232.27 (current version at FLA. STAT. §
232.27(1)-(3) (1977)). Chapter 232 was amended, 1976 Fla. Laws, ch. 76-236, § 6, and is now
embodied in FLA. STAT. § 232.275 (1977) which defines the liability of a teacher or principal
as follows: "Except in the case of excessive force or cruel and unusual punishment, a teacher
• ..shall not be civilly or criminally liable for any action carried out in conformity with the
state board and district school board rules regarding the control, discipline, suspension, and
expulsion of students."
2. 346 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
3. Id. at 1040.
4. Id. at 1041.
5. Id. The court stated:
This statute, in authorizing-in fact requiring-a teacher to "keep good order"
in his classroom necessarily implies the power to the teacher to use reasonable
physical force (not amounting to corporal punishment) to do so. Without such




Distinguishing the facts in Williams from those in McDonald
v. Ford,' the court stated:
The vital difference in the case here and the case in McDonald
is that here the record establishes that the defendant was author-
ized by law to take the action he did, to lay hands on the plaintiff,
but in doing so used excessive force resulting in serious injury to
Cotton. The use of excessive force in the performance of a lawful
and authorized act, resulting in injury to another, may constitute
actionable negligence.7
In holding that the exercise of excessive force by one lawfully
authorized to use limited physical force may constitute negligence
rather than an intentional tort, the court appeared to liken the facts
before it to cases involving the use of excessive force in situations
where limited physical force would be protected by either the privi-
lege of public necessity or self-defense In each instance, the privi-
lege is generally limited to that which is or reasonably appears to
be necessary under the circumstances. It has also been stated, how-
ever, that such excessive physical force is unprivileged and consti-
tutes an intentional tort rather than simple negligence."
The court in Williams appears to provide teachers with a lim-
ited privilege to effect the statutory "good order" requirement
through the use of that degree of physical force which falls short of
"corporal punishment." In balancing the defendant's conduct
against the social purpose to be achieved, however, the court fails
to delineate meaningful limitations to the privilege. At what point
is excessive physical force tantamount to "corporal punishment"
within the statute, and under what circumstances should such force
be viewed as an intentional tort rather than simple negligence?
These questions are left unanswered.
II. FALSE IMPRISONMENT AND FALSE ARREST
It is well recognized that the Florida courts "have equated the
torts of false arrest and false imprisonment, stating that the differ-
ence is one of terminology."'" Underlying the tort of false imprison-
6. 223 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
7. 346 So. 2d at 1041. Under the First District's view, such use of excessive force falls
within the classic definition of negligence. See, e.g., 57 Am. JuR. 2d Negligence § 1 (1971).
8. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 16, at 98, 99 n.6, § 19, at
108-12, § 24, at 124-27 (4th ed. 1971); Bohlen, Incomplete Privilege to Inflict Intentional
Invasions of Interests of Property and Personality, 39 HARV. L. REv. 307 (1926).
9. See W. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 19, at 109-10.
10. Jackson v. Biscayne Medical Center, Inc., 347 So. 2d 721, 723 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977);
Johnson v. Weiner, 155 Fla. 169, 19 So. 2d 699 (1944).
1978]
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ment is a notion of the social desirability of protecting an individ-
ual's personal interest in freedom from restraint of movement. An
action for false imprisonment will generally lie when one intention-
ally confines another to a limited area without consent or privilege."
The confinement must be such that there is either no exit or that
all available means of departure would expose the plaintiff to an
unreasonable risk of harm.
In Jackson v. Biscayne Medical Center,2 the plaintiff, a former
patient, brought an action against the medical center, inter alia, for
false imprisonment. Although the facts are not reported in detail,
the District Court of Appeal, Third District, held that where a hos-
pital exercises unlawful restraint against an individual and detains
him against his will in order to procure his arrest for trespassing, an
action may lie for false imprisonment. In addition, the court noted
that the plaintiff's claim was not within the purview of the medical
liability mediation panel requirements of section 768.44 of the Flor-
ida Statutes.'3 In so holding, the court stated:
The fact that these facts originate, rather remotely, from a
hospital-patient relationship, will not bring them into the ambit
of medical malpractice. To hold otherwise would lead to the ab-
surd result that every wrongful act committed by a hospital em-
ployee in a hospital surrounding amounts to medical malpractice.
Certainly, our Legislature did not desire those results. 4
The issue of the applicability of the statute of limitations to a
cause of action for false imprisonment committed by a municipal
corporation was addressed in Leatherwood v. City of Key West. 5
In Leatherwood, the plaintiff was arrested for assaulting an officer.
The action, however, was dismissed when the complaining officer
failed to appear in court. Approximately twenty-nine months later,
the plaintiff brought an action against the city for false arrest, false
imprisonment and malicious prosecution. In affirming summary
judgment for the city, the District Court of Appeal, Third District,
held that an action for false imprisonment accrues on the day of the
arrest, and that the period of limitation with respect to the city is
one year from the accrual of the cause of action, 6 absent facts or
11. W. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 11, at 42.
12. 347 So. 2d 721 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
13. Id. at 722. See also FLA. STAT. § 768.44 (Supp. 1976) (current version at FLA. STAT. §
768.44 (1977)). For a discussion of the medical mediation panel requirement and recent cases
decided thereunder, see text accompanying notes 334-59 infra.
14. 347 So. 2d at 722.
15. 347 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
16. See FLA. STAT. § 95.24 (1973) (repealed 1974 Fla. Laws, ch. 74-382, § 26).
[Vol. 32:1233
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circumstances which either toll the statute or estop the city from
interposing the statute as an affirmative defense. 7
III. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION AND ABUSE OF PROCESS
A. Malicious Prosecution
In Florida, six essential elements must be established to sustain
a cause of action based upon malicious prosecution:
[Flirst, the commencement or continuance of an original crimi-
nal or civil judicial proceeding; second, its legal causation by the
present defendant against the present plaintiff; third, its bona
fide termination in favor of the present plaintiff; fourth, absence
of probable cause; fifth, presence of malice; and sixth, damage
conforming to the legal standards resulting to the plaintiff.",
In Jackson v. Biscayne Medical Center," the Third District
stated that
the essential prerequisite to bringing an action for malicious pros-
ecution-a bona fide termination of prosecution in favor of a
plaintiff-is satisfied if there is either an adjudication on the
merits in a judicial proceeding or, if there is a nolle prosequi or
declination to prosecute entered in good faith by the prosecutor.2
In Clayton v. City of Cape Canaveral,2' the owner and operator
of a "bottle club ' 2 2 initiated an action against the city and its chief
of police for malicious prosecution based upon facts which reflected
that city officials who opposed the operation of the club caused
plaintiffs Clayton and McGrath to be arrested numerous times for
alleged violations of a city zoning law. There was evidence that the
plaintiffs' property was not within the scope of the zoning law and
17. 347 So. 2d at 442.
18. Arison Shipping Co. v. Hatfield, 352 So. 2d 539, 539 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977); see Shil-
dowsky v. National Car Rental Sys., Inc., 344 So. 2d 903, 904 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977); Applestein
v. Preston, 335 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
19. 347 So. 2d 721 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
20. Id. at 723; accord, Davis v. McCrory, 262 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972); Arison
Shipping Co. v, Hatfield, 352 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977) (dismissal of an action for lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction is not an adjudication on the merits and, therefore, does not
constitute a bona fide termination of the prior civil suit). In arriving at its conclusion in
Arison, the Third District relied upon decisions rendered in other jurisdictions. See, e.g.,
Siegel v. City of Chicago, 127 11. App. 2d 84, 261 N.E.2d 802 (App. Ct. 1970); Roy v. Landers,
467 S.W.2d 924 (Mo. 1971); Heaney v. Purdy, 29 N.Y.2d 157, 272 N.E.2d 550, 324 N.Y.S.2d
47 (1971); Weber v. Johnston Fuel Liners, Inc., 540 P.2d 535 (Wyo. 1975).
21. 349 So. 2d 722 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977) (decision withdrawn from the Southern Reporter
at the request of the court).
22. The term "bottle club" refers to a business which permits the consumption of alco-
holic beverages after the operating hours of bars and cocktail lounges. Id.
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that the city officials were aware of the law's inapplicability.
Relying on McCain v. Andres, 3 the District Court of Appeal,
Fourth District, held that a municipality may not be held liable for
malicious prosecution and added that a municipality is also im-
mune from liability when citizens are wrongfully prosecuted by its
officers and agents under an admittedly void and unconstitutional
ordinance .2 The court noted that its result was consistent with deci-
sions rendered by the First and Second Districts, 2 commenting that
the Third District has also acknowledged a "protective cloak of
immunity. '"26
Assuming arguendo that the city officials in Clayton did in-
struct their chief of police to enforce the ordinance with the knowl-
edge that it was inapplicable to plaintiffs' property, there would be
little doubt that the necessary elements of malicious prosecution
had concurred. In light of the "intentional and outrageous nature
of the tort, '2 7 it would appear that the availability of legal redress
to an injured victim would be a matter of paramount public con-
cern. The court in Clayton, however, ignored the malicious acts of
the city's policemen and councilmen and focused instead upon the
"protective cloak of immunity," without considering whether the
nature of the malicious conduct should affect the application of the
doctrine. In a situation where the evidence indicates that city offi-
cials have abused their power by harassing one conducting himself
in a lawful manner, the protective cloak of immunity should be
evaluated with greater circumspection lest automatic application
leave the injured plaintiff without a remedy.
The issue of "whether the filing of an information by the state
attorney in a criminal prosecution raises, in a subsequent malicious
prosecution action . . ., a presumption of probable cause to believe
that the criminal defendant was guilty of the offense charged" was
recently addressed by the Supreme Court of Florida in Colonial
Stores, Inc. v. Scarborough," as a result of an alleged conflict be-
tween the First District's holding below and the Third District's
decision in McKinney v. Dade County. 9 In McKinney, it was held
23. 139 Fla. 391, 190 So. 616 (1939).
24. 349 So. 2d at 723; accord, Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla.
1957); Elrod v. City of Daytona Beach, 132 Fla. 24, 180 So. 378 (1938).
25. Calbeck v. Town of S. Pasadena, 128 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961); Middleton v.
City of Fort Walton Beach, 113 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1959).
26. 349 So. 2d at 723 (citing City of Miami v. Albro, 120 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1960)).
The court also noted that its view was in accord with those advanced in decisions rendered
in other states. Id.
27. W. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 119, at 850.
28. 355 So. 2d 1181, 1183 (Fla. 1977), aff'g 338 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
29. 341 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
1238 [Vol. 32:1233
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that a properly filed information conclusively determines that the
evidence is adequate to establish probable cause.
In Colonial Stores, the plaintiff filed an action for false impris-
onment and malicious prosecution after he was arrested and incar-
cerated for the robbery of a food store. The store manager had ob-
served the physical characteristics of the robber earlier in the day
and reported the information to the police shortly after the robbery.
On the following day, the Jacksonville police received an anony-
mous telephone call informing them that the robber was travelling
on a certain street in a particular car. On the basis of the store
manager's description and the anonymous telephone call, the plain-
tiff was arrested without a warrant. After the plaintiff was identified
in a line-up by eyewitnesses, an affidavit was executed by the police.
Based upon the affidavit, an information was filed by the state
attorney. Two months later, another person confessed to the rob-
bery. Although the confession ultimately led to a nolle prosequi of
the plaintiff's case, plaintiff was incarcerated from the time of his
arrest until the time of the confession.
30
At the conclusion of trial, the court instructed the jury that the
filing of an information against the plaintiff gave rise to a presump-
tion of probable cause. The jury subsequently found for the plain-
tiff, and the defendants appealed. Although the First District dis-
agreed with the trial court's instruction and held that no presump-
tion of probable cause arises from the filing of an information, they
nevertheless failed to find reversible error on this ground." The
Supreme Court of Florida approved the reasoning of the First Dis-
trict.
Despite the defendants' reliance upon Gallucci v. Milavic,32 in
which it was held that a magistrate's finding of probable cause gives
rise to a conclusive presumption3 of validity in a subsequent mali-
cious prosecution action, the court refused to extend the Gallucci
presumption to a prosecutor's decision .3 Prior to McKinney, no
30. 355 So. 2d at 1183.
31. Id. at 1184.
32. 100 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 1958).
33. The so-called Gallucci presumption presupposes, however, the absence of fraud or
other corrupt means employed by the person initiating the prosecution. 355 So. 2d at 1184.
34. The court, declined to "accord the Gallucci presumption" to the prosecutor's deci-
sion to prosecute, and distinguished Ward v. Allen, 152 Fla. 82, 11 So. 2d 193 (1942), which
held that the filing of an information constitutes evidence tending to show reasonable grounds
for prosecution without the assistance of presumptive effect. It likewise distinguished Meade
v. Super Test Sales, 306 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975), in which the District Court of Appeal,
Second District, found that there was reasonable cause for the state attorney's decision to
prosecute. 355 So. 2d at 1184.
1978] 1239
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presumptive effect was accorded the filing of an information.35 In
overruling McKinney, the Supreme Court of Florida pointed to
McKinney's heavy reliance on State ex rel. Hardy v. Blount,'3 and
noted that Hardy failed to constitute a valid basis for the defen-
dants' position. Although Hardy held that a prosecutor's finding of
probable cause through the filing of an information has the same
practical effect as an identical finding by a magistrate,37 the court
distinguished the facts in Hardy from those in Colonial Stores and
noted that the effect of Hardy was overturned by the Supreme Court
of the United States in Gerstein v. Pugh."5
At the heart of the Supreme Court of Florida's refusal to extend
the Gallucci presumption is the inherent inconsistency between the
prosecutor's responsibility to law enforcement on the one hand and
the constitutional role of a neutral and detached magistrate on the
other."9 In holding that no presumption of probable cause arises
from the filing of an information with respect to the charge upon
which the action is based, the supreme court adhered to its earlier
declaration in Ward v. Allen,40 where it was held that the filing of
an information merely constitutes evidence of the existence of rea-
sonable grounds for prosecution."
The subject of privilege as a defense to malicious prosecution
assumed a novel dimension in a case of first impression, Stone v.
Rosen."2 In Stone, an attorney and his law firm instituted a mali-
cious prosecution action against a citizen who had filed a grievance
against the plaintiffs with The Florida Bar. The grievance arose out
of a dispute involving certain funds to be used for the purchase of
realty. In that case, the Grievance Committee of The Florida Bar
found no probable cause for further disciplinary proceedings. In
35. The court emphasized that prior to McKinney v. Dade County, 341 So. 2d 1061 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1977), the presumption of probable cause for purposes of a malicious prosecution
action applied solely to a judicial determination of probable cause in the prior criminal
proceeding. 355 So. 2d at 1185.
36. 261 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1972).
37. Id. The court's holding in Hardy was predicated upon the rationale that both the
magistrate and the state attorney are Florida Constitutional Officers. See FLA. CONST. art.
V, §§ 5, 6 & 17.
38. 420 U.S. 103 (1975). In Gerstein, the Supreme Court refused to find the filing of an
information to be the constitutional equivalent to a neutral and detached magistrate's finding
of probable cause.
39. 355 So. 2d at 1184-85. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), highlights the contrast
between the executive role of the prosecutor in vindicating the interests of the state, and the
judicial role of the magistrate which requires that he remain wholly unbiased and disinter-
ested.
40. 152 Fla. 82, 11 So. 2d 193 (1942).
41. 355 So. 2d at 1185.
42. 348 So. 2d 387 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
[Vol. 32:1233
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affirming the trial court's judgment that the defendant was quali-
fiedly privileged in filing a complaint against Stone with The Flor-
ida Bar, the District Court of Appeal, Third District, went on to
hold that, in fact, a citizen enjoys an absolute privilege to make a
complaint against a member of Florida's integrated Bar.43
Notwithstanding a split of authority regarding the extent of a
citizen's privilege to file a complaint against an attorney, the court
relied heavily upon the New Jersey case of Toft v. Ketchem," which
focused upon the need to balance two conflicting policy considera-
tions:
On the one hand, there is injury that may be suffered by an
attorney as a result of the institution of disciplinary proceedings
against him on what turns out to be improper or groundless
charges. Even if the charges against him are found to be baseless
and the complaint is dismissed, he still may suffer from the pub-
lic knowledge of these proceedings which may damage his reputa-
tion and injure his ability in the future to earn a living.
On the other hand, however, it is in the public interest to
encourage those who have knowledge of any unethical conduct of
attorneys to present such information to the appropriate ethics
and grievance committee so that this court may carry out its
constitutional disciplinary duties.
In attempting to do justice as between these two conflicting
interests, we are necessarily forced to give great weight to the fact
that we have been charged by Constitution with the solemn duty
of ridding the bar of those who are unfit to practice our profession
. . . If each person who files a complaint with the ethics and
grievance committee may be subject to a malicious prosecution
action by the accused attorney there is no question but that the
effect in many instances would be the suppression of legitimate
charges against attorneys who have been guilty of unethical con-
duct, a result clearly not in the public interest. And although to
deprive an attorney of his right to recover damages in a civil
action for the malicious filing of such a complaint without proba-
ble cause occasionally works a hardship upon the attorney...
we are of the opinion that this result must follow if we are to
properly carry out our constitutional duty to maintain the high
standards in our bar.4 5
In holding that an absolute privilege was an appropriate de-
fense, the Third District adopted the balancing test set forth in
Toft, and stated:
43. Id. at 388.
44. 18 N.J. 280, 113 A.2d 671, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 887 (1955).
45. 348 So. 2d at 389 (quoting Toft v. Ketchem, 18 N.J. 280, 284-87, 113 A.2d 671, 674-
75, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 887 (1955)).
19781
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Members of the legal profession are accorded rights and privileges
not enjoyed by the public at large; the acceptance of these carries
with it certain responsibilities and obligations to the general pub-
lic. . . . [O]ne who elects to enjoy the status and benefits as a
member of the legal profession must give up certain rights or
causes of action. .... 4.
Recognizing the potential impact of Stone, the Third District
properly expressed its intention to certify the decision to the Su-
preme Court of Florida as passing upon a question of great public
interest.47
It cannot be gainsaid that the balancing approach embraced by
the courts in Toft and Stone takes great pains to balance the equi-
ties of all parties affected by the relationship between the attorney
and the public which he has sworn to serve with integrity and com-
petence. Moreover, the collective effect of attorney misconduct
casts an indelible aspersion upon the Bar in the eyes of the public.
Although arguments can be made in support of either position, the
real question seems to be whether members of the Bar, solely by
reason of their occupational status, should be precluded from vindi-
cating the legitimate right of self-protection against groundless
abuses of process. The proper solution, it seems, is one of degree.
Before leaving the attorney without any viable means of re-
covering damages for even the most groundless and spurious allega-
tions, it seems necessary to consider two additional matters appar-
ently overlooked by the court in Stone. Firstly, each member of the
public is charged with the general duty to refrain from engaging in
intentionally tortious conduct such as malicious prosecution." If the
public is given an absolute privilege to file grievances with The
Florida Bar, what measures will be left to prevent abuse?" Sec-
ondly, what legitimate end suggested by the absolute privilege could
not be equally well served by a carefully constructed qualified privi-
lege that fairly attempts to protect both the competent attorney and
the interests of society? 0 Absolute privilege is a defense rarely ac-
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See W. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 119, at 834.
49. One measure which could serve to mitigate the potentially harsh results arising from
an abuse of the absolute privilege is the confidentiality of grievance proceedings until a
determination of probable cause has been made. Although confidentiality would not prevent
abuses of the privilege, it would appear to assist in achieving a manageable balance between
the attorney's right to protect his professional reputation from baseless aspersions on the one
hand and the public's need to rid the bar of unethical practitioners on the other.
50. A carefully constructed qualified privilege could provide an atmosphere conducive
to the socially beneficial objective of encouraging the public to file their justifiable complaints
with the appropriate authority while still permitting the attorney to protect his professional
[Vol. 32:1233
TORTS
corded in the law,"' and it should not be expanded without substan-
tial justification.5 2 Unless The Florida Bar is willing, for example,
to hold confidential grievance procedures up to and including the
time when probable cause is found, the absolute privilege accorded
to the public could easily be abused in such a manner as to become
tantamount to subjecting the attorney to harrassment for proper
conduct which is nevertheless disappointing to the client. Clearly,
the law never contemplated that an attorney ensure the total satis-
faction of his client.
B. Abuse of Process
Closely related to the tort of malicious prosecution is that of
abuse of process. A leading authority explains that the underlying
purpose of this cause of action is to provide a remedy for cases "in
which legal procedure has been set in motion in proper form, with
probable cause, and even with ultimate success but nevertheless has
been perverted to accomplish an ulterior purpose for which it was
not designed. ' 5 3 Abuse of process differs from malicious prosecution
in that the "gist of the tort is not commencing an action or causing
reputation. Such a qualified privilege should be fashioned in such a manner as to give the
benefit of any reasonable doubt to the complainant in a close case where there is no evidence
of a bad faith motive underlying the institution of grievance proceedings. By utilizing the
definition of the word "malice" as enunciated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964), attorneys could maintain actions for malicious prosecution in cases where the
charges brought are knowingly false or made with reckless disregard of the truth or falsity
thereof. Under such a qualified privilege, the interests of both the attorney and the public
would be adequately safeguarded while still allowing the intentional tortfeasor to be answera-
ble for his conduct. Certainly the law has no interest in protecting that conduct falling outside
the scope of the New York Times privilege.
51. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 114, at 776.
52. By stripping an attorney of his right to recover affirmative relief in an action for
malicious prosecution under circumstances which would otherwise be proper, the court runs
the risk of creating an environment in which attorneys may, like other professional groups,
harbor feelings of alienation and distrust toward the public they have undertaken to serve.
Such a situation is counterproductive to the open communication necessary for the develop-
ment of a mutually satisfying attorney-client or attorney-public relationship.
It cannot be gainsaid that those most severely injured by the unethical practitioner are
the members of the legal community themselves. It would not seem unfair that as a quid pro
quo for maintaining the right to seek legal, albeit qualified redress for injuries incurred
through the malicious prosecution of grievance proceedings, the legal community must make
a collective effort to rid the bar of those whose conduct obviously falls below a minimal level
uniformly applied to all members of the bar. ABA CODE OP PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,
CANON 1, DR 1-103, fashions each attorney as "his brother's keeper." Perhaps a more consci-
encious adherence to this grave, often unpleasant responsibility would serve to obviate the
court's willingness to surrender certain rights or causes of action on behalf of attorneys solely
because of their occupational status as members of the bar.
53. W. PossFR, supra note 8, § 121, at 856. See also Baya v. Revitz, 345 So. 2d 340, 342
(Fla. 3d Dist.) (Haverfield, J., dissenting), cert. discharged, 355 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 1977); Cline
v. Flagler Sales Corp., 207 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
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process to issue without justification, but misusing, or misapplying
process justified in itself for an end other than that which it was
designed to accomplish."5 Thus, it is the purpose for which the
process is used once it is issued that lies at the heart of the tort.
In a dissenting opinion filed by Judge Haverfield in Baya v.
Revitz,5 5 the elements of abuse of process are clearly set forth as
follows:
The elements of an action for abuse of process are (1) the defen-
dant made an illegal, improper, perverted use of the process, a
use neither warranted nor authorized by the process; (2) the de-
fendant had an ulterior motive or purpose in exercising such ille-
gal, perverted or improper use of process; (3) the plaintiff sus-
tained damages as a result thereof."
Unlike the tort of malicious prosecution, it is unnecessary, in
alleging abuse of process, to show that the prior proceedings were
terminated in favor of the plaintiff or that the proceeding was initi-
ated without probable cause. The two torts do, however, share "the
common element of an improper purpose in the use of legal pro-
cess."57
The ulterior motive element of the tort usually manifests itself
as a form of coercion used to obtain a collateral advantage not
properly a part of the proceeding forming the basis of the abuse. In
other words, abuse of process often assumes the dimensions of extor-
tion in which legal process is substituted for the threat or the club."
In Baya, the plaintiff instituted an action for abuse of process
based upon an appeal taken by defendant from a consent judgment.
54. W. PaOSSER, supra note 8, § 121, at 856.
55. 345 So. 2d 340, 342 (Fla. 3d Dist.) (Haverfield, J., dissenting), cert. discharged, 355
So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 1977).
56. Id.
57. W. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 121, at 856-57. In the treatise, an example is provided
which simplifies the distinction between the torts of malicious prosecution and abuse of
process and which was quoted with approval by the District Court of Appeal, First District,
in Bradley v. Peaden, 347 So. 2d 455, 456-57 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977), and the District Court of
Appeal, Third District, in Cline v. Flagler Sales Corp., 207 So. 2d 709, 711 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
It reads: "[i]f the defendant prosecutes an innocent plaintiff for a crime without reasonable
grounds to believe him guilty, it is malicious prosecution; if he prosecutes him with such
grounds to extort payment of a debt, it is abuse of process." W. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 121,
at 857.
58. W. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 121, at 857. Prosser provides examples of the types of
cases which show the context in which the extortion inherent in abuses of process was ef-
fected. The examples include attachment, garnishment, execution, sequestration, criminal
arrest and prosecutions and even the use of a subpoena for the collection of a debt. Of greater
importance, however, is Prosser's observation that although "[tihe ulterior motive or pur-
pose may be inferred from what is said or done about the process, .... the improper act may
not be inferred from the motive." Id. at 858.
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In the prior appeal, the District Court of Appeal, Third District,
held that since the record established that the stipulation by and
between the parties constituted a settlement, the resulting consent
judgment could not be appealed. 9 In the instant case, the trial court
resolved the abuse of process action in the plaintiffs favor.
Holding that the consensual partition judgment formed a pro-
per basis for appeal, 0 the Third District stated:
[T]he taking of an appeal which presents to the appellate court
justiciable issues decided after a full consideration hereof upon
the briefs, oral argument and record, as a matter of law is not an
abuse of process under the elements of the common law action
as they exist in the State of Florida."2
In a sound dissent, Judge Haverfield carefully clarified the facts
set forth by the majority and noted that the defendant testified that
he would have been placed in an unfavorable income tax bracket if
he had received the money pursuant to the 1972 consent judgment
during that year. Judge Haverfield also emphasized that upon the
entry of the consent judgment, the money was tendered by plaintiff
but rejected.2 As indicated in the dissent:
Delaying the receipt of money pursuant to a consent judgment so
as to avoid the tax consequences resulting therefrom clearly is an
end other than which an appeal is designated to accomplish.
There being no dispute that plaintiff-appellee was damaged by
the prosecution of the appeal in Baya v. Revitz, supra, a prima
facie case was proven by plaintiff-appellee and, therefore, I would
affirm the judgment entered .
3
In light of the additional facts supplied by the dissent, it would
appear that the majority lost sight of the fact that it is the ulterior
motive or improper purpose underlying the appeal that determines
the abuse of process and not merely the propriety of a consent judg-
ment as a basis for appeal. Although the elements of the tort were
framed in a-unique context, Judge Haverfield's appraisal that the
plaintiff proved a prima facie case, appears to reflect a clear under-
59. Baya v. Revitz, 281 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
60. The Third District refused to reach the question of whether it is an abuse of process
to appeal a consent judgment. 345 So. 2d at 341. On certiorari to the Supreme Court of
Florida, the court focused upon the Third District's specific finding that it was not necessary
to pass upon the very question which it thereafter certified. The supreme court, therefore,
held that it was without jurisdiction to consider and decide the question. Revitz v. Baya, 355
So. 2d 1170, 1171-72 (Fla. 1977).
61. 345 So. 2d at 342.
62. Id. at 342 n.1 (Haverfield, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 342.
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standing of both the nature and application of the tort."4
In Bradley v. Peaden,5 an action for abuse of process was filed
by plaintiff against her uncle as a result of a dispute arising from
the sale of two sets of scuba equipment owned by the defendant's
daughter. The defendant alleged that plaintiff paid for one set,
while plaintiff maintained that the parties understood that the pur-
chase price was to be applied to the purchase of both sets."6
Thereafter, defendant told plaintiff that if she did not pay for
the equipment or return it, he would swear out a warrant for her
arrest and that, as a result, she would be unable to obtain employ-
ment. When plaintiff failed to return the equipment, the defendant
signed a criminal affidavit charging plaintiff with grand larceny.
The plaintiff was tried and acquitted. At the trial of her subsequent
action for abuse of process, the court directed a verdict for defen-
dant.
The District Court of Appeal, First District, reversed, noting
that an issue of fact is presented where evidence reflects that a
defendant utilized criminal process as a means of coercing another
to return property or to pay a civil debt. 7
IV. DEFAMATION
A. Libel
1. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE DEFENSE OF PRIVILEGE
Broadly stated, a prima facie case of defamation is formulated
when it has been established that: (1) A statement defamatory of
64. The majority's holding appears to confuse the tort of abuse of process with that of
malicious prosecution. It appears to ignore that the nature of the action is not the action of
causing process to issue without justification or probable cause, but rather the misapplication
or misuse of process "justified in itself for an end other than that which it was designed to
accomplish." W. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 121, at 856. The fact that the issues presented on
appeal were justiciable and decided upon briefs, oral argument and the record may have a
bearing on an action for malicious prosecution, but is by no means inconsistent with a cause
of action for the tort of abuse of process. Of greater signifiance are the following facts: (1)
defendant refused plaintiff's tender of money upon entry of the consent judgment; (2) defen-
dant testified that he would have been placed in an unfavorable income tax bracket if he had
received the funds during the year of the consent judgment; (3) delaying receipt of the money
tendered under the consent judgment for the purpose of avoiding adverse tax consequences
is an ulterior or improper end neither warranted nor authorized by the appellate process; and
(4) damage to plaintiff existed as a result of defendant's prosecution of the appeal. 345 So.
2d at 342. It would appear that the foregoing factual considerations should have been regarded
by the court as being of operative significance in determining whether the plaintiff stated a
cause of action for abuse of process.
65. 347 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
66. Id. at 456.
67. Id.; see Cline v. Flagler Sales Corp., 207 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968); W. PROSSEa,
supra note 8, § 121, at 857.
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and concerning the plaintiff has been published to a third person
for which statement and publication the defendant is responsible;
(2) the third party understood the defamatory meaning; and (3) the
publication is actionable." Once these elements have been estab-
lished, it becomes incumbent upon the defendant to interpose his
defenses. Privilege and truth are two defenses which are firmly en-
trenched in the jurisprudence of defamation and, when successfully
proved, operate as complete defenses to the tort.6" During the past
year, the defense of privilege has been a focus of judicial attention
in Florida's district courts of appeal.
In Campbell v. LoPucki,' ° the issue facing the District Court of
Appeal, First District, was whether defamatory allegations con-
tained in a complaint drafted and signed by an attorney are privi-
leged where a subsequent libel action has been brought against the
attorney. Under the facts of Campbell, the defendant-attorney was
employed to represent a decedent's parents in a wrongful death
action arising from the automobile death of their son. In the second
count of the complaint, it was alleged that one McMullen murdered
the decedent either by striking him or by pushing him from the
vehicle. It was also alleged that McMullen and Campbell conspired
to purchase large amounts of insurance on the decedent's life with
the intention of staging his death and collecting the insurance pro-
ceeds. In a subsequent newspaper article, the defendant-attorney
was reported as having agreed that the wording of the complaint was
intended to accuse Campbell and McMullen of murder. The attor-
ney took sole responsibility for all of the allegations contained in the
complaint."
Relying upon the authority of Myers v. Hodges," the First Dis-
trict agreed with the trial court's finding that allegations contained
in a complaint are absolutely privileged and affirmed the dismissal
of the libel action." The court stated:
68. See W. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 114, at 776 n.64 (citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §
613 (1938)). For a more detailed definition of the so-called "twin torts" of libel and slander,
see id. § 112, at 751-66.
69. See W. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 114, at 776.
70. 345 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
71. Id. at 861.
72. 53 Fla. 197, 44 So. 357 (1907). In Myers, the Supreme Court of Florida announced
the long standing Florida rule regarding the publication of defamatory words during the
course of a judicial proceeding. Briefly stated, defamatory words published by counsel, parties
or witnesses in the due course of a judicial proceeding are absolutely privileged if relevant to
or connected with the case before the court. Even when the defamatory words are not relevant
to the proceeding, to be actionable they must also be malicious and spoken or written without
a belief in their relevance or without reasonable or probable cause to believe so.
73. 345 So. 2d at 861.
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In sum, we agree with the trial court's holding that the allegations
of murder, homicide, conspiracy and other wrongdoings were rel-
evant to the previous action. As noted by the Supreme Court in
the Myers case, "In determining what is pertinent, however,
much latitude must be allowed to the judgment and discretion
of those who maintain a cause in court. Much allowance should
be made for the earnest though mistaken zeal of a litigant who
seeks to address his wrong and for the ardent and excited feelings
of the fearless, conscientious lawyer, who must necessarily make
his client's cause his own."7
The defense of qualified privilege to an action for libel was
addressed in the recent case of Belcher v. Schilling.75 In Belcher,
certain policy disagreements divided the board of directors of
Belcher Oil Company into two factions which subsequently became
involved in a proxy battle calculated to obtain support for the re-
spective company policies of each faction. The Belcher group pre-
vailed, and, as a result, the Schilling group brought an action to set
aside the election on the ground that the proxies were procured by
fraud. Subsequently, the parties to the suit entered into a stipula-
tion which provided that the status quo of the company would be
maintained. Throughout this period, the Belcher group had been
negotiating with an Exxon executive concerning the possibility of
his becoming the new president of Belcher Oil. 7"
Upon learning of the negotiations, an attorney for the Schilling
group sent a letter to the Exxon executive informing him of the
stipulation as well as the pending litigation against the Belchers.
Based upon this letter, the Belcher group instiuted an action against
the Schillings for libel. At the trial's conclusion, judgment was en-
tered for the defendants.
In affirming the trial court's verdict for the defendants, the
District Court of Appeal, Third District, restated the law regarding
the nature and extent of the qualified privilege defense in defama-
tion actions when the communication is made in good faith by one
who either has an interest in the subject matter or a duty to commu-
nicate with another having a corresponding duty or interest."
74. Id. at 862 (quoting 53 Fla. at 211, 44 So. at 362). The First District refused to
distinguish Myers and its progeny on the ground that the subject pleadings were signed by
the attorney and not by the complaining parties as in Myers. Finding that such a distinction
is "ill-founded," the court noted that under FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.030(b), an attorney must sign
his pleadings and added that an attorney's signature on a pleading does not and usually
cannot guarantee the truthfulness of the facts cited. 345 So. 2d at 862 (citing Metcalf v.
Langston, 296 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974)).
75. 349 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
76. Id. at 186.
77. Id. For a discussion of the context in which the qualified privilege defense to defama-
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The first amendment constitutional privilege regarding defa-
mations of public officials and public figures, which has evolved
from New York Times Co. v. Sullivan" and Curtis Publishing Co.
v. Butts," framed the legal issues addressed in Finkle v. Sun Tattler
Co."s Applying this first amendment privilege, the District Court of
Appeal, Fourth District, found, that the plaintiff, having formerly
held the position of city attorney, was a public official or public
figure under the New York Times rule with respect to his activities
"relating thereto or emanating therefrom."'" Thus, the New York
Times standard of "actual malice""2 is the "applicable rule by which
to measure accountability of [the paper] for . . . libel.
83
2. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF LIBEL PER SE AND LIBEL PER QUOD
Under the facts of Barry College v. Hull,4 Hull was employed
by Barry College as its director for business affairs and later as vice
president for business affairs under two consecutive one year em-
ployment contracts. Prior to the expiration of the latter contract,
Hull entered into a two year contract which was to extend through
June 30, 1974. In March 1973, Hull notified the president of the
college by written memorandum that he would be seeking employ-
ment elsewhere. After several policy disagreements between Hull
and the Barry administration, the board of trustees "determined to
accept Hull's 'resignation.' "" A written notice was placed on the
tion actions most frequently arises, see W. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 115, at 785-92.
It should be noted that the immunity afforded by the qualified privilege will be lost if
the defendant exceeds the scope of the privilege. The existence of the qualified privilege
presupposes its reasonable exercise for a proper purpose and without malice. Id. at 792-93.
78. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In the New York Times case, the Supreme Court of the United
States articulated a standard in defamation actions which is applicable to public officials and
which is markedly distinct from that which is applicable to private individuals. The distinc-
tion between the two standards is predicated upon the Court's definition and use of the term
"malice" with respect to defamation actions involving public officials. Thus, from the New
York Times case and its progeny evolved the constitutional limitation under which a public
official or public figure is permitted to recover damages for defamatory falsehoods. Recovery
could be had only if it were first shown that the statement had been made with "actual
malice" as defined by the Court; that is, that the statement had been made with the knowl-
edge that it was false or with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity thereof. Malice in
the sense of spite or ill will is not sufficient to defeat the qualified privilege. See Henry v.
Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965).
79. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
80. 348 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
81. Id. at 52; see Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75
(1966).
82. See note 78 supra.
83. 348 So. 2d at 52.
84. 353 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
85. Id. at 577.
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bulletin board of Barry College informing the college community
that Hull had tendered his resignation several months prior to the
date of the memo and that the board "makes it effective as of this
date."8 Based upon this memorandum, Hull brought an action
against Barry College for libel and slander,87 which resulted in a jury
verdict in favor of Hull based upon a jury charge of libel per se which
effectively precluded the jury from deciding whether the notice
"constituted libel per se, libel per quod or no libel at all."" The
District Court of Appeals, Third District, reversed, finding that the
trial court erred in determining that the notice constituted libel per
se.
It is well-settled that a defamatory publication will constitute
libel per se if, in the absence of innuendo, it: (1) tends to subject
one to hatred, distrust, contempt or ridicule; (2) tends to injure one
in his trade or business; or (3) "imputes to another conduct, charac-
teristics, or a condition incompatible with the proper exercise of his
lawful business, trade, profession or office."89 Libel per quod, on the
other hand, is established when, in addition to publication, extrinsic
facts are necessary to ascertain the defamatory meaning conveyed.
Following what it called the "pertinent holding" in Wolfson v.
Kirk," that "neither the court nor the jury may go beyond the four
corners of the publication in determining whether or not there is
86. Id.-
87. Hull alleged that his being "fired" in such an abrupt manner effectively prevented
him from getting a job in the academic world because it raised the implication that he had
been fired for serious misconduct. He also claimed that Barry College's entire course of
conduct in firing him without notice in the middle of an academic year and publishing a false
memorandum constituted a defamation which was incompatible with the proper exercise of
his profession. Id.
88. Id. at 578. In effect, the trial judge had directed the jury to find libel if they found
that Hull had been fired.
89. Id.; see Adams v. News-Journal Corp., 84 So. 2d 549 (Fla. 1955); Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Brautigam, 127 So. 2d 718, 722 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1961).
90. Florida courts have treated libel per quod like slander with respect to the necessity
of alleging and proving special damages as a prerequisite to the recovery of general damages.
Thus, if the imputation of libel per quod falls into one of the so-called special slander catego-
ries which the courts have traditionally treated as slander per se, the libel per quod, like
slander per se, will be actionable without allegation or proof of special damages. If not, the
plaintiff will not recover general damages unless his special damages are first pleaded and
proved. See Barry College v. Hull, 353 So. 2d 575, 578; Harriss v. Metropolis Co., 118 Fla.
825, 160 So. 205 (1935).
Libel per se, on the other hand, is actionable without allegation or proof of special
damages since the courts will impute malice and damages from the words themselves. See
Campbell v. Jacksonville Kennel Club, 66 So. 2d 495, 497 (Fla. 1953). "Therefore, in such
cases, general damages need not be pleaded or proved, and special damages need not be
shown to sustain the action. Moreover, malice is presumed as a matter of law." 353 So. 2d at
578.
91. 273 So. 2d 774, 778 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
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libel per se,"' the Third District held that there could be no libel
per se since, in order to ascertain whether Hull resigned or was fired,
it would be necessary to step beyond the four corners of the allegedly
defamatory notice. Noting that the record reflected no evidence of
damages arising from the publication, so as to give rise to an action
for libel per quod, the court concluded that it was error for the trial
judge to fail to direct a verdict for Barry College on the issue of
libel.2
B. Slander
The District Court of Appeal, First District, in Bobenhausen v.
Cassat Avenue Mobile Homes, Inc. , discussed and clarified the law
relating to statements constituting slander per se.
After terminating his employment with the defendant, plaintiff
Bobenhausen sought employment with other companies which re-
quested that he provide information relating to his past employ-
ment. In each instance, the plaintiff was denied employment based
upon statements made by his prior employer that Bobenhausen was
a "thief and a crook" who "stole him blind."94 Thereafter, Boben-
hausen organized his own company which he attempted to finance
through Finance America Company. After receiving a credit report
reflecting that Bobenhausen was discharged from the defendant's
employ for stealing, Finance America terminated its relationship
with plaintiff and refused to deal further with him. Bobenhausen
then brought suit against the defendant for slander. At the conclu-
sion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Bobenhausen,
awarding $30,000 in compensatory damages and $50,000 in punitive
damages."
In response to the defendant's contention that punitive dam-
ages may not be awarded unless actual damages are shown, the
court reviewed the applicable law regarding the types of compensa-
tory damages recoverable in defamation actions. It stated:
In determining the types of compensatory damages recovera-
ble in a defamation suit, Florida recognizes two classes: general
and special. General damages are those which the law presumes
must naturally, proximately and necessarily result from publica-
tion of the libel or slander. They are allowable whenever the
92. 353 So. 2d at 578.
93. 344 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
94. Id. at 280.
95. Id. at 281. The amount of damages awarded to Bobenhausen was later made subject
to a remittitur of $40,000.
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immediate result is to impair the plaintiff's reputation, although
no actual pecuniary loss is demonstrated ...
Special damages do not result by implication of law from a
wrongful publication and, unlike general damages, must be spe-
cially pled. It is necessary for a plaintiff to show his special dam-
ages proximately resulted from the defamation."
In explaining the types of defamation which justify an award of
general damages without the pleading and proving of special dam-
ages, the court stated:
Words which are actionable in themselves, or per se, necessarily
import general damages and need not be pleaded or proved but
are conclusively presumed to result. Moreover malice is pre-
sumed as a matter of law from the publication of such words.
* * * Spoken words falsely imputing a criminal offense to
another are actionable per se. Clearly then the statement made
by Boucher to another that Bobenhausen was a "thief and a
crook" who "stole him blind" was slander per se, if false.7
Rejecting the defendant's argument that a plaintiffs pecuniary
loss must be determined to a reasonable certainty as a prerequisite
to punitive damages, the First District, following the general rule
applied in libel actions, stated: "[Elven though no special dam-
ages may have been proved, a plaintiff may still recover punitive
damages upon a showing that the publication was made for malice
or ill-will toward him. . . . [W]e are of the opinion that punitive
damages may be awarded independent of proof of compensatory
damages . . . .
96. Id.
97. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Certain categories of slander are presumed,
by their very nature, to cause damage. Such categories are actionable as slander per se. The
four categories of slander most frequently deemed to be actionable per se include words
which: (1) impute that plaintiff is guilty of a crime involving moral turpitude; (2) impute
that plaintiff is afflicted with a contagious, infectious or loathsome disease; (3) tend to harm
plaintiff in his trade, business profession or office; or (4) impute unchastity to a female. Of
the foregoing categories, only the first three were recognized at common law. Words which
are considered as slanderous per se are considered more egregious than other words because
of their increased tendency to harm one's reputation, to exclude one from society or to
jeopardize one's means of earning a living.
Related to the third category of slander per se are the torts of trade libel and trade
slander. In the recent case of Kilgore Ace Hardware, Inc. v. Newsome, 352 So. 2d 918 (Fla.
2d Dist. 1977), the Second District opined that:
It is now well recognized that a person, and a corporation as well, may recover
damages for injuries suffered because of . . .[the] publication of false defama-
tory matter which tends to be prejudicial in the conduct of a trade or business or
to deter third persons from dealing in business with him.
Id. at 920. Compare Collier County Pub. Co. v. Chapman, 318 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975)
with Upton House Cooler Corp. v. Alldritt, 73 So. 2d 848 (Fla. 1954). See also Diplomat Elec.,
Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co., 378 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1967).
98. 344 So. 2d at 282.
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In determining whether the award of punitive damages was
excessive, the court noted that the answer was dependent upon
whether plaintiff adequately established malice resulting from the
publication and whether plaintiff adequately established special
damages to support the award." Holding that the trial judge abused
his discretion in grantfing a remittitur, the First District reversed,
noting that "courts have uniformly held that the relationship of
punitive damages to actual damages cannot be reduced to a mathe-
matical certainty. . . .[A] ratio of ten to one punitive damages
was impliedly approved by the court."'00
V. FRAUD AND DECEIT
Under Florida law, in order for fraud to be actionable, the fol-
lowing elements must appear:
(1) a misrepresentation of a material fact,
(2) [a] knowledge of the representor of the misrepresentation, or
[b] representations made by the representor without knowledge
as to either truth or falsity, or, [c] representations made under
circumstances in which the representor ought to have known, if
he did not know, of the falsity thereof,
(3) an intention that the representation induce another to act on
it, and
(4) resulting injury to the party acting in justifiable reliance on
the representation.'0 '
The same elements are required in cases in which fraud is asserted
as a defense to a contract.' °2
With respect to the element of reliance, it has been held that
when a defendant made affirmative representations for the purpose
of inducing a plaintiff to act to his detriment, he cannot thereafter
complain that the plaintiff did, in fact, rely upon the representa-
tions made.' 3 This rule, however, is not without exception. Citing
Davis v. Dunn'01 and Beagle v. Bagwell,'°5 the District Court of
Appeal, Fourth District, has noted that:
99. Id.
100. Id. at 283 (emphasis added). It is well-settled in Florida that "the power of the court
to permit or require the entry of a remittitur should only be exercised in cases where the
amount of excess is apparent or readily ascertainable." Smith v. Jackson County, 134 Fla.
354, 356, 183 So. 738, 739 (1938).
101. Barnett Bank v. Capital City First Nat'l Bank, 348 So. 2d 643, 645 (Fla. Ist Dist.
1977) (quoting Kutner v. Kalish, 173 So. 2d 763, 765 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965)).
102. See, e.g., George Hunt, Inc. v. Wash-Bowl, Inc., 348 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
103. Martin v. Paskow, 339 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
104. 58 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 1952).
105. 215 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968).
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In Davis, supra, the Supreme Court held that a purchaser is not
entitled to rely on the representations of the seller where the
means and opportunity to inspect the premises are equally avail-
able to both parties. In a later decision the First District recog-
nized a necessary corollary to the Davis rule:
In essence, then, where a vendor by hig actual decep-
tion, artifice, or misconduct conceals the evidence of a
defective condition in such a way as to render it incapa-
ble of detection from a reasonable and ordinary inspec-
tion of the house, the vendor can no longer rely upon the
purchaser's duty to inspect because such conduct by the
vendor serves to impair the purchaser's opportunity to
make a meaningful inspection. 06
It has also been suggested that, under certain circumstances, the
facts giving rise to injury may be such as to place the plaintiff on
sufficient notice that he should make further investigation regard-
ing the truth of the defendant's representations.0 7
In Butts v. Dragstrem,"8 purchasers of a mobile home subdivi-
sion brought an action against the seller to recover damages for
misrepresentations regarding the net income of the property. In
stating that the plaintiff should have done more than merely request
an opportunity to inspect the vendor's books, the District Court of
Appeal, First District, held that the plaintiff's reliance upon the
fraudulent representations was not justified under the circumstan-
ces. The court stated:
The right of reliance is also closely bound up with a duty on the
part of the representee to use some measure of protection and
precaution to safeguard his interests. His justifiable reliance goes
to the heart of the problem. In the absence of a showing of a
fiduciary or confidential relationship, if there is no accompanying
actual deception, artifice, or misconduct, where the means of
knowledge are at hand and are equally available to both parties
and the subject matter is equally open to their inspection, one
106. Queenan v. Flynn, 347 So. 2d 686, 687 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977) (quoting 215 So. 2d at
26).
107. See Pitzer v. Levine, 344 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977). In Pitzer, an action was
brought by a lessee against the lessors for alleged fraudulent misrepresentations regarding the
square footage of office space upon which the lessee relied in entering into a lease for office
space. No mention was made in the lease as to the square footage or rental per square foot.
However, a preliminary layout of the office space, including its dimensions, was attached to
the lease. The Second District held that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether or not plaintiff was on sufficient notice to require him to investigate and to determine
the true square footage of the office space.
108. 349 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
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disregarding them will not be heard to say that he was deceived
by the other's misrepresentations.'
The court added that plaintiff's former close, personal friend-
ship and mutual religious interests with the defendant did not give
rise to the fiduciary or confidential relationship necessary to justify
his reliance under the circumstances."
0
In Charter Air Center, Inc. v. Miller,"' the District Court of
Appeal, Second District, emphasized that where one relies upon a
misrepresentation, actionable fraud will not lie unless the plaintiff
actually suffers damages or injury from the reliance."' The princi-
ple, as applied to fraud as a contractual defense, is explained in
George Hunt, Inc. v. Wash-Bowl, Inc.,"' in which the Second Dis-
trict remarked:
It is recognized, in Florida and other jurisdictions where fraud is
asserted as a defense to a contract, that all essential elements of
the fraudulent conduct, including some injury, must be met.
[citations omitted]. As stated in the early case of Stokes v.
Victory Land Co., 99 Fla. 795, 128 So. 408, 410 (1930),
"it is of the very essence of an action of fraud and
deceit that the same shall be accompanied by damage,
and neither damnum absque injurie nor injurie absque
damnum by themselves constitute a good cause of ac-
tion ...
This principle is so generally understood and uni-
versally recognized that citation of authority is a work
of supererogation."
This rule then is applicable whether the pleadings alleging fraud
are defensive or offensive in nature and is not dependent on the
stage of performance of the contract at the time suit is instituted.
...[Tihe general rule enunciated in 37 Am. Jur. 2d, Fraud and
Deceit § 292 (1968), [is] "[Diamage need not be subject to
accurate measurement in money, but may result from the fact
that the defrauded party has been induced to incur legal liabili-
109. Id. at 1207 (emphasis added). See also Farnham v. Blount, 152 Fla. 208, 11 So. 2d
785 (1942); Beagle v. Bagwell, 215 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1968); Kaminsky v. Wye, 132 So.
2d 44 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
110. 349 So. 2d at 1207. The First District did note, however, that although close friend-
ship was not enough to sustain Dragstrem's action, "the relation and correlative duties
necessary to give rise to such status need not be legal but may be moral, social, domestic or
merely personal." Id. See also Dale v. Jennings, 90 Fla. 234, 107 So. 175 (1925).
111. 348 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
112. Id. at 616.
113. 348 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
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ties or obligations different from those represented or contracted
for . "...- 4
It is well-settled that both punitive and compensatory damages
may be properly awarded for an action based upon fraud. Punitive
damages are not proper, however, unless the basis for the action is
a tort "which involve(s) ingredients of malice, moral turpitude, or
wanton and outrageous disregard of the plaintiffs rights.""8
In Hermes v. Anton,"' the court noted that the degree of mali-
ciousness, the defendant's ability to pay and the reasonableness of
the relationship between the respective awards of punitive and com-
pensatory damages are all factors to be considered in determining
the amount of punitive damages to be awarded. In addition, the
District Court of Appeal, Third District, held that punitive damages
amounting to approximately ten times the compensatory award
were not excessive." 7 Attorney's fees, absent special circumstances,
are not a proper element of damages for fraud in Florida."'
The legal effect of a party's performance of obligations under a
theretofore wholly executory contract after the discovery of fraud
was recently discussed in Mirenda v. Steinhardt."' In Mirenda,
Steinhardt brought an action against the vendors of his condomi-
nium apartment for fraud and breach of contract with respect to an
obstruction of his view of the Intracoastal Waterway from his bal-
cony. At trial, Steinhardt testified that: (1) his primary purpose for
selecting his condominium unit was its view of the Intracoastal
Waterway; (2) he experienced the view prior to purchase; (3) the
defendant's brochure contained representations regarding the view;
and (4) although he knew that the defendants were planning to
construct an identical condominium to the east of his building, he
was assured that his view of the Intracoastal Waterway would not
be affected. 4 Based upon these representations, Steinhardt exe-
cuted the purchase contract.
Prior to closing, Mirenda discovered that the view from the
condominium apartment complex would be obstructed and, as a
result, wrote to each of the affected owners, informing them of the
problem and advising that those prospective purchasers wishing to
114. Id. at 912-13 (emphasis added).
115. 348 So. 2d at 616 (quoting 9 FLA. JUR. Damages § 119 (1956)).
116. 346 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
117. Id. at 1206. See also Bobenhausen v. Cassat Ave. Mobile Homes, Inc., 344 So. 2d
279, 283 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977); Air Line Employees Ass'n Int'l v. Turner, 291 So. 2d 670 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1974).
118. Martin v. Paskow, 339 So. 2d 266, 267-68 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
119. 350 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
120. Id. at 500.
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rescind their contract could do so. Steinhardt received the letter but
did not respond or take any action toward rescinding this contract.
Instead, he attended the closing, paid the contract price and re-
ceived a warranty deed. Several months later, Steinhardt brought
suit. At trial, judgment was entered for plaintiff.
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, reversed, follow-
ing the generally accepted rule in Florida that:
Where a contract is wholly executory, . . . if one party ascertains
that the other has been guilty of fraud in the procuring or making
of the contract or with reference to the subject matter thereof, he
may repudiate the contract, . . . and in such circumstances the
defrauded party may not remain silent as to the fraud and per-
form the contract and then claim damages for the fraud. It is very
generally held that one who discovers that fraud has been prac-
ticed upon him while the transaction remains wholly executory,
but nevertheless either executes or performs it on his part or
requires performance on the part of the other thereby waives the
fraud and cannot subsequently maintain an action for damages
therefor. 121
VI. CONSPIRACY
Ordinarily, an act which does not constitute a cause of action
against one alleged offender cannot be made the basis of a civil
action for conspiracy. 2 ' In Margolin v. Morton F. Plant Hospital
Association, Inc.,'23 the District Court of Appeal, Second District,
eschewed the general rule in favor of an exception recognized in
cases where "by reason of the force of numbers of other exceptional
circumstances the conduct of the defendants acting in concert could
be such as to give rise to an independent wrong."' 24
In Margolin, the plaintiff, a surgeon in good standing at the
defendant hospital brought an action against a group of anesthesiol-
ogists on the hospital staff, alleging that he had been effectively
prevented from practicing surgery at the hospital as a result of the
defendants' concerted refusal to provide necessary anesthesia serv-
121. Id. at 501 (emphasis added) (quoting with approval from 37 AM. Jun. 2d Fraud and
Deceit § 394 (1968)); see Street v. Barrow Growers Processing Corp., 67 So. 2d 228, 232 (Fla.
1953), in which the Supreme Court of Florida stated that "[tihe party claiming fraud ...
cannot sit idly by and wait until conditions suit him to put the other party on notice or to
take action with reference to rescission of ... [the] contract."
122. Churruca v. Miami Jai-Alai, Inc., 353 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 1977); Snipes v. West Flagler
Kennel Club, Inc., 105 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 1958); Liappas v. Agoustis, 47 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 1950);
Margolin v. Morton F. Plant Hosp. Ass'n, Inc., 342 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
123. 342 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
124. Id. at 1092; see Churruca v. Miami Jai-Alai, Inc., 353 So. 2d 547, 550 (Fla. 1977);
Snipes v. West Flagler Kennel Club, Inc., 105 So. 2d 164, 165 n.1 (Fla. 1958).
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ices to plaintiff's patients until such time as plaintiff's wife dis-
missed a pending legal claim against them. The plaintiff further
alleged that "by virtue of their unique position as the only anesthe-
siologists on the hospital staff and their concerted refusal to provide
him with general anesthesia services, the members of the group have
interfered with the contractual rights between him and his pa-
tients."'25
The court recognized that although any of the group members
could have lawfully declined to render services to the plaintiff, for
any reason, a different result inheres when the entire group declines
to do so, and the effect is to preclude the plaintiff from practicing
surgery at the hospital.' 8
Following Snipes v. West Flagler Kennel Club, Inc.,"27 and the
Restatement of Torts'28 regarding a group's concerted refusal to
deal, the court held that the plaintiff stated a cause of action for
conspiracy and stated:
In essence, even though a person has the privilege of selecting
those with whom he wishes to conduct business, when several
persons who occupy a coercive position with respect to another
act in concert to decline to do business with him, their refusal
may under certain circumstances constitute an independent
tort. 2I
As a result of an allegation that a District Court of Appeal,
Third District, decision' 0 was in conflict with Margolin and Snipes,
the Supreme Court of Florida in Churruca v. Miami Jai-Alai'
3'
granted certiorari to decide the issue of "whether a complaint is
actionable which alleges that defendants maliciously conspired to
punish plaintiffs by depriving them of their livelihood. 132 In
Churruca, the controversy arose out of a strike affected by newly
unionized Jai Alai players against the frontons where they were
employed. The frontons responded to the strike by hiring less distin-
guished players who eventually became well liked by the fans. After
recognizing the failure of their collective effort, the striking Jai Alai
players unsuccessfully sought reemployment from their respective
frontons. As a result of their unemployed status, the players were
125. 342 So. 2d at 1091.
126. Id. at 1093.
127. 105 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 1958).
128. RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs § 765 (1939).
129. 342 So. 2d at 1094 (emphasis added).
130. Churruca v. Miami Jai-Alai, 338 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976), rev'd in part, 353
So. 2d 547 (Fla. 1977).
131. 353 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 1977), rev'g in part 338 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
132. 353 So. 2d at 548.
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refused licenses from the Department of Business Regulation. The
players then sued the frontons for conspiring not to employ them.
33
The Supreme Court of Florida held that the players' complaint
stated a cause of action for tortious conspiracy against the frontons.
The court noted that the players must "demonstrate that the con-
spirators acted with evil motive"' 3' in order to sustain their cause
of action. Relying heavily on Margolin and Snipes, the court stated:
"In essence, this Court stated that ordinarily there can be no inde-
pendent tort for conspriacy. However, if the plaintiff can show some
peculiar power of coercion possessed by the conspirators by virtue
of their combination, which power an individual would not possess,
then conspiracy itself becomes an independent tort.' ' 3 The court
then went on to articulate the nature of the tort: "The essential
elements of this tort are a malicious motive and coercion through
numbers or economic influence."
36
In response to the defense contention that at common law, as
well as under applicable federal'37 and state statutes,3 ' combina-
tions for economic coercion in connection with labor disputes did
not give rise to an actionable wrong, the court particularly clarified
its holding with respect to so-called "labor disputes."
While we do not hold . . . that Chapter 542, Florida Statutes
(1975) provides a cause of action to petitioners in the context of
this case, nevertheless, we do not accept the contention that a
cause of action for tortious conspiracy is precluded simply by
casting the veil of "labor dispute" over the controversy. When the
conduct of a combination of employers, maliciously conceived
and executed, amounts to a "black listing" of employees so as to
permanently deprive them of the means of earning a livelihood,
a common law cause of action is presented upon which a jury may
return damages.39
VII. "TORT OF INSURER'S BAD FAITH"
In recognizing that an insurer has an implied duty under its
contract of insurance to deal fairly and in good faith with its in-
133. Id. at 549. The Department of Business Regulation was also named as a defendant
but was dismissed from the suit because, as a department of the executive branch, it had
not waived its sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court of Florida agreed and upheld the
department's dismissal from the suit. Id. at 551.
134. Id. at 549.
135. Id. at 550. See also Des Lauries v. Shea, 300 Mass. 30, 13 N.E.2d 932 (1938).
136. 353 So. 2d at 550. See also Hunter Lyon, Inc. v. Walker, 152 Fla. 61, 11 So. 2d 176
(Fla. 1942); Regan v. Davis, 97 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1957).
137. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-40 (1976).
138. FLA. STAT. § 542 (1977).
139. 353 So. 2d at 551.
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sured, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Florida, in Escambia Treating Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co., ' expanded the insurer's liability for bad faith. It concluded
that, under Florida law, an insurer is tortiously liable for wrongfully
refusing to pay the valid claims of its insured. 4'
Underlying the decision in Escambia is a progressive willing-
ness in Florida and in a growing number of other jurisdictions to
provide a tort remedy for an insurer's bad faith refusal to honor the
reasonable expectations of its insured under the insurance con-
tract."'
In determining that Florida would recognize a cause of action
for the breach of an implied duty arising from the insurance con-
tract to deal fairly and in good faith with its insured in the process-
ing and payment of the insured's claims, the Escambia court relied
upon the rationale developed by the California courts in Fletcher v.
Western National Life Insurance"' and Gruenberg v. Aetna Insur-
ance Co.'" Since these decisions, California has achieved recogni-
tion as the leading jurisdiction for permitting recovery, in tort,
where an insurer breaches its duty to deal fairly and in good faith."5
In Gruenberg, the Supreme Court of California articulated its anal-
ysis of an "emerging cause of action" which the Escambia court
acknowledged as "reflect[ing] the policy or concept that an insured
purchases insurance and not an unjustified court battle when he
enters the insurance contract.""' The supreme court stated:
It is the obligation, deemed to be imposed by the law, under
which the insurer must act fairly and in good faith in discharging
its contractual responsibilities. Where in so doing, it fails to deal
fairly and in good faith with its insured by refusing, without
140. 421 F. Supp. 1367 (N.D. Fla. 1976).
141. Id. at 1368. In Escambia, the district court's jurisdiction was predicated upon diver-
sity of citizenship of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970). Although Florida
substantive law was controlling, the legal issue presented in Escambia pertained to law on
which Florida courts had not ruled. In such an instance, the task of the district court is to
determine how the Florida courts would pass on the issue if it were before them.
142. See, e.g., Eckenrode v. Life of Am. Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1972); United Serv.
Auto Ass'n v. Wesley, 526 P.2d 28 (Alas. 1974); Silbert v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal.
3d 452, 521 P.2d 1103, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1974); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 556,
510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973); Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins., 10 Cal. App. 3d
376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (Ct. App. 1970); Ledingham v. Blue Cross Plan for Hosp. Care of Hosp.
Serv. Corp., 29 111. App. 3d 339, 330 N.E.2d 540 (App. Ct. 1975), rev'd in part, 64 111. 2d 338,
356 N.E.2d 75 (1976); Citizens Discount & Inv. Corp. v. Dixon, 499 S.W.2d 231 (Mo. Ct. App.
1973).
143. 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (Ct. App. 1970).
144. 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).




proper cause, to compensate its insured for a loss covered by the
policy, such conduct may give rise to a cause of action in tort for
breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
.* . . It is manifest . . . that in every insurance contract there
is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The duty
to so act is imminent in the contract whether the company is
attending to the claims of third persons against the insured or the
claims of the insured.
• .. [Wihen the insurer unreasonably and in bad faith
withholds payment of the claim of its insured, it is subject to
liability in tort.
4 7
Following the Gruenberg rationale that the duty to act fairly
and in good faith in the processing and payment of the legitimate
claims of its insured is a different aspect of the insurer's existing
duty to deal fairly and in good faith in accepting reasonable settle-
ment offers, the Escambia court reasoned: "Florida courts have
clearly recognized the insurer's duty to act in good faith and accept
reasonable settlements . . . .Logically, the Florida courts would
also accept the 'aspect of the same duty' requiring the insurer to act
fairly and in good faith in handling the claims of its own insured.' ' 8
In addition, the federal district court noted that in an action for
breach of the implied duty, a "plaintiff. . .may recover compensa-
tory, and in the proper case punitive, damages in accordance with
existing Florida law.'
'49
The Florida courts have not hesitated to impose judgments in
excess of policy limits against insurers who have failed to act in good
faith in accepting reasonable offers. 150 This aspect of the duty was
first recognized by the Supreme Court of Florida in Campbell v.
Government Employees Insurance Co."'5 In that case, the court up-
held both the existence of the implied duty and an award of punitive
damages for its breach.
In Butchikas v. Travelers Indemnity Co.,152 the Supreme Court
of Florida qualified the Campbell result in cases involving insurer
nonfeasance by refusing to allow punitive damages and damages for
mental anguish. 5 3 Viewing the nonfeasance situation as "less egre-
147. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d at 574-75, 510 P.2d at 1037-38, 108 Cal. Rptr.
at 485-86.
148. 421 F. Supp. at 1370.
149. Id. at 1371.
150. See, e.g., Campbell v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 306 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 1975);
Thompson v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 250 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
151. 306 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 1975).
152. 343 So. 2d 816 (Fla. 1976).
153. Id. at 818. The court noted that its independent research was unproductive of
precedent supporting an award of compensation for mental anguish in an "excess" case. "The
1978]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
gious than those involving deliberate, overt and dishonest deal-
ing,"' 54 the court held that an aggrieved insured was made amply
whole through a compensatory award and recovery of attorney's
fees. The thrust of these cases appears clear: "Tort liability does not
result from the mere assertion of a weak and ultimately insufficient
defense by the insurance company. The refusal to pay the insured's
claim must be unreasonable and in bad faith."'55
VIII. ASSUMPTION OF RISK
The interposition of the doctrine of assumption of risk as an
affirmative defense has long been an effective shield for personal
injury defendants, acting as a complete bar to recovery. Frequently
regarded as a disfavored defense, the doctrine of assumption of risk
has been viewed by many as the judicial articulation of a morally
unacceptable social policy, which revels in a history replete with
instances of indiscriminate misapplication," 6 entailing substantial
human misery.'57
Faced with a conflict among districts, the Supreme Court of
Florida in Blackburn v. Dorta5 s was called upon to assess whether,
in light of Florida's acceptance of the doctrine of comparative negli-
gence in Hoffman v. Jones,' the doctrine of assumption of risk
remained viable as an absolute bar to recovery. Accepting what it
termed as an invitation to join the growing "trend of dissatisfaction
with the doctrine,"'' " Florida became the most recent jurisdiction to
abrogate the defense."'
rule in Florida has been that, absent a physical injury, a plaintiff can recover damages for
mental anguish only where it is shown the defendant acted with such malice that punitive
damages would be justified." Id. at 819. See also Crane v. Loftin, 70 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 1954).
154. 343 So. 2d at 818.
155. Escambia Treating Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 421 F. Supp. 1367, 1370 (N.D.
Fla. 1976).
156. Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287, 292 (Fla. 1977). For a description of the confu-
sion surrounding the doctrine, see Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54, 68-69 (1943)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
157. 348 So. 2d at 289 n.1.
158. 348 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1977).
159. 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973). In the Hoffman case, the Supreme Court of Florida
abandoned contributory negligence as a complete bar to recovery and instead adopted the
rule of comparative negligence. Hoffman expressly left open the question whether assumption
of risk was, in effect, the functional equivalent of contributory negligence. Id. at 439.
160. 348 So. 2d at 290.
161. Id. at 2.90-91:
The breed of assumption of risk with which we deal here is that which arises
by implication or implied assumption of risk. Initially it may be divided into the
categories of primary and secondary. The term primary assumption of risk is
simply another means of stating that the defendant was not negligent, either
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TORTS
Acknowledging that the "line of demarcation" between contri-
butory negligence and assumption of risk had been difficult to de-
fine, the court determined that assumption of risk is tantamount to
contributory negligence and, therefore, subject to the principles of
comparative negligence enunciated in Hoffman.'
IX. COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
For the first time since its adoption of comparative negligence
in Hoffman v. Jones,"3 the Supreme Court of Florida in Lawrence
v. Florida East Coast Railway Co. "4 addressed the issue of whether
special verdicts must be used in trials at which comparative negli-
gence is in issue if either party requests their use. This issue arose
in view of the supreme court's statement that "[iun accomplishing
these purposes, the trial court is authorized to require special ver-
dicts to be returned by the jury and to enter such judgment or
judgments as may truly reflect the intent of the jury as expressed
in any verdict or verdicts which may be returned."'' 5
The court acknowledged that special verdicts assist courts in
ascertaining whether the comparative negligence doctrine is ac-
tually being applied to effect its "desired goal of apportioning dam-
ages on the basis of fault."'66 In aligning itself with a small number
of states that specifically provide for special verdicts in comparative
negligence cases, the court held:
[S]pecial verdicts shall be required in all jury trials involving
because he owed no duty to the plaintiff in the first instance, or because he did
not breach the duty owed. Secondary assumption of risk is an affirmative defense
to an established breach of a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff ...
• . . The affirmative defense brand of assumption of risk can be subdivided
into the type of conduct which is reasonable but nonetheless bars recovery (some-
times called pure or strict assumption of risk), and the type of conduct which is
unreasonable and bars recovery (sometimes referred to as qualified assumption
of risk).
162. Id. at 293; accord, Weedman v. Sunland Roller Rink, Inc., 349 So. 2d 752 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1977) (action for injuries received at a roller rink); Carlin v. Goldman Indus. Inc., 347
So. 2d 827 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977) (action for injuries sustained in a fall on a dance floor).
163. 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
164. 346 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 1977).
165. Id. at 1015 (quoting Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973)).
166. Id. at 1016. See also Maloney, From Contributory to Comparative Negligence: A
Needed Reform, 11 U. FLA. L. REv. 135 (1958); Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MICH.
L. REv. 465 (1953); Timmons & Silvis, Pure Comparative Negligence in Florida, 28 U. MIAMI
L. REv. 737 (1974). It has also been observed that special verdicts: (1) allow for the correction
of jury error; (2) force detailed consideration by the jury rather than allowing it to jump to a
conclusion on a "gut reaction;" and (3) enable the court to avoid the necessity of long,
complicated jury instructions which could give rise to reversible error. Id. at 802.
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comparative negligence. When comparative negligence is at issue
in non-jury trials, the court shall make findings of record required
by special verdicts.
Since courts have heretofore exercised their discretion in re-
quiring special verdicts, as authorized in Hoffman v. Jones,
supra, this decision shall be prospective only from the effective
date of this decision and shall have no retroactive effect.1
7
In Stuyvesant Insurance Co. v. Bournazian,"' the Supreme
Court of Florida was asked to construe the meaning and operation
of the terms "set-off' and "recoupment" as used in the Hoffman
case. Stuyvesant arose from a personal injury action between the
Bournazians and the Rileys based upon an accident between an
automobile owned and driven by Bournazian and an automobile
driven by Riley and owned by her husband.' At the conclusion of
the trial, separate jury verdicts were returned for each party under
the doctrine of comparative negligence. The trial court then aggre-
gated the personal injury verdicts for each set of parties and netted
the lesser award against the greater award, thereby producing a net
judgment in favor of the parties receiving the larger award. The
District Court of Appeal, Second District, reversed by awarding
each recipient the full amount of his individual award.7 0 In affirm-
ing the decision of the Second District, the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida distinguished the facts and set-off theory enunciated in
Hoffman from the case before it.'
167. 346 So. 2d at 1017. The court explained:
The trial court was following the law as it existed at the time of the trial when he
chose not to require special verdicts. To require a new trial now because special
verdicts were not used would be like changing the rules after a game had been
played and requiring a rematch.
Id. at 1016. See also Kirkland v. Johnson, 346 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977); Public Health
Foundation for Cancer & Blood Pressure Research, Inc. v. Cole, 352 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 4th Dist.
1977).
168. 342 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 1977).
169. Id. at 472. The sequence of events can best be illustrated as follows: B was involved
in an automobile accident with an automobile driven by R and owned by R's husband. B
brought an action against the Ra and their insurer. B's wife filed a derivative claim as a result
of the injuries to her husband. R counter-claimed against B and his insurer for her injuries,
and R's husband filed a derivative claim. B was awarded $8,500. B's wife was awarded $1,500,
against both of the Rs and their insurer. R was awarded $19,000, and R's husband was
awarded $1,000. After the trial court aggregated the Bs' verdicts and netted them against the
aggregate of the Rs' verdicts, the result was a net judgment of $10,000 in favor of the Ra.
170. The effect was to hold both insurance companies liable for the full amount assessed
by the jury against their respective insureds with no dollar off-sets between identical party
insureds.
171. 342 So. 2d at 472 n.2. The court distinguished Hoffman from the instant case noting
that Hoffman involved the significantly different fact situation where the plaintiff and defen-
dant were the only parties to the litigation. The question of insurer's liability did not arise.
It is this distinction to which the court attributed the difficulty encountered by the trial court
and district court in attempting to apply the "set-off" theory announced in Hoffman.
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After reconsidering the rationale of its original decision,'72 the
court concluded that "the notion of set-off should have no effect on
the contractual obligation of liability insurance carriers to pay the
amounts for which their insureds are legally responsible."'' The
court noted that the verdicts resulting from the trial determine the
"legal liability" of the parties under section 624.605(1)(b) of the
Florida Statutes (1975). The insureds' legal liabilities give rise to a
duty, under the terms of each insurance contract, on the part of the
respective insurers to pay the awards entered against their in-
sureds. "' Conforming its decision to that of the Second District, the
court concluded:
Nothing in Hoffman, the insurance laws, or the public policy of
this state justifies our reading into a standard automobile liabil-
ity insurance contract a requirement that a partially-negligent
but fully-insured person should absorb a portion of the cost of his
negligence. The purpose of the contract is precisely to the con-
trary, being designed and paid for to relieve the insured of all
172. Id. at 472-74. In its initial opinion, the court began by recognizing the principle that
the liability of the insurers was derivative only and represented a responsibility to pay an
amount first determined to be owed by another. Proceeding on this theory, the court deter-
mined the amount owed by each party and held that the Hoffman type of set-off should be
applied by "netting" the individual liability of each party before determining what each
insurance company would pay. In other words, the insurer's liability was determined after
the off-sets were applied.
173. Id. at 473. The court arrived at this conclusion notwithstanding its belief that its
original view as to the amount to be paid among the parties themselves was correct under
Hoffman. The court went on to state: "The effect of set-off as an antecedent to payment by
each insurer is to abrogate the parties' respective insurance contracts by providing an unwar-
ranted second level of comparative recovery reductions-the jury's award being the first." Id.
Noting that the term "set-off' as used in Hoffman was applied in a nontechnical sense, the
court opined:
Hoffman established the principle of set-off as between injured parties . . . in
order to avoid an unnecessary exchange of checks and the possibility of inequita-
ble judgment executions. Set-off in comparative negligence cases, then, is no more
than a mechanical device by which the court forces partial payment of an amount
the jury has determined to be legally owing.
Id.
174. Id. The court pointed out that to allow each insurance carrier to recoup its insured's
financial liability to other parties would materially vary the terms of each insurance contract.
The court provided the following helpful example:
[T]he jury here determined that Royce Bournazian was entitled to receive $8,500
from Betty Riley. If recoupment is allowed for the insurer to the extent of the
$19,000 which Royce owed Betty, then (i) he would receive nothing from her
carrier despite its contract liability to pay the amounts for which Betty became
legally liable, and (ii) Betty would receive $10,500 from Royce's carrier despite
its contract liability to pay all amounts for which he became legally liable. The
effect of so holding would be tantamount to our requiring Royce to pay to Betty
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such obligations (within policy limits and over agreed deducti-
bles, of course). We conclude, therefore, that the concept of "set
off" (more properly "recoupment") as announced in Hoffman
applies only between uninsured parties to a negligence action, or
to insured parties to the extent that insurance does not cover
their mutual liabilities. The doctrine has no effect on the contrac-
tuail obligations of liability insurance carriers. "5
In Mosca v. Middleton,' a recent automobile collision case in
which the evidence disclosed that both the plaintiff and defendant
entered an intersection against a red light, the District Court of
Appeal, Third District, held that notwithstanding a plaintiffs negli-
gence, "a jury may find that defendant's negligence was the sole
proximate cause of the accident."'" The court further acknowledged
that even if the plaintiff had been negligent, it is possible that the
plaintiff's negligence "may not have contributed to the proximate
cause of the accident."'78 In so holding, the court made clear its
refusal to eschew the traditional rules of causation as an accommo-
dation to the adoption of the comparative negligence framework.
X. NEGLIGENCE
Generally stated, "negligence is the omission to do that which
a reasonable man guided by those considerations which ordinarily
regulate the conduct of human affairs would do or the doing of an
act which a reasonable person would not do."' 79 The essential ele-
ments in the traditional formula of actionable negligence are: (1)
the existence of a legal duty owing to the plaintiff from the defen-
dant; (2) a breach of that duty by the defendant; (3) a causal rela-
tion between the breach of the duty; and (4) actual injury or dam-
age.
A. Negligent Acts and Duties Owed
It is well-settled in Florida, as well as in other jurisdictions, that
the duty aspect of the negligence formulation presupposes a stan-
dard of conduct, recognized by law, for the protection of others
against unreasonable risks of harm.' 0 The failure of a defendant to
175. Id.
176. 342 So. 2d 986 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
177. Id. at 987. See also Petroleum Carrier Corp. v. Gates, 330 So. 2d 751 (Fla. 1st Dist.
1976); Vertommen v. Williams, 287 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974); Henry v. Britt, 220 So.
2d 917 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
178. 342 So. 2d at 987.
179. Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co., 156 Eng. Rep. 1047 (Ex. 1856); cf.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 283 (1938); W. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 32, at 150.
180. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 8, §§ 53-56, at 324-50.
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conform his conduct to that standard is the fulcrum on which the
question of liability generally rests. 8' The duty is measured by the
scope of the risk which the negligent conduct foreseeably entails,
112
and it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to show that he is within the
class of persons sought to be protected.
8 3
The duty of an owner and operator of a store to provide a
reasonably safe method of ingress and egress was recently evaluated
in Thompson v. Ward Enterprises.8' In that case, an injured cus-
tomer brought an action for injuries sustained when an automobile
parked perpendicular to the entranceway of the store started for-
ward and struck the customer who was waiting for the store's truck
to pick up his groceries for delivery. The area in which the customer
was standing was open, level and without physical barriers separat-
ing the entranceway from parked automobiles. There was a sign
which prohibited parking in front of the store entrance. The court
viewed the case as revolving around the concept of duty.'85
Distinguishing Thompson from a case in which a business invi-
tee was injured inside the store by an automobile,M the court held
that the customer presented a prima facie showing of negligence
based upon the duty of the store to provide a reasonably safe
method of ingress and egress.'87
In Speigel v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., ' an
action was brought against the utility company on the theory that
it negligently maintained a utility pole so near the highway as to
cause the decedent's fatal injury when his automobile collided with
the pole. In affirming the trial court's summary judgment for defen-
dant, the court stated: "a utility company is under no obligation to
181. See generally id. at 338-50.
182. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 281 (1938).
183. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). See also
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 281, Comment c (1938); Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L.
REv. 1 (1953). In Palsgraf, Judge Cardozo, speaking for the New York Court of Appeals, noted
that a finding of negligence was a function of the foreseeability of harm to the person injured.
184. 341 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
185. Id. at 838. The court held that "the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty to exercise
sufficient care to maintain the store premises, including the parking area, in a reasonably
safe condition for the use of the store's customers." Id.
186. See Schatz v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 128 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1961). In Schatz, it was
claimed that the defendant store breached its duty of care to a business invitee by either
failing to regulate the parking of motor vehicles in front of the store so that they would not
be directly headed toward the interior of the store while parked or to provide an adequate
curb, barrier or wall. The First District, however, held that the injury to the plaintiff inside
the store by an automobile parked facing the store was unusual and extraordinary and,
therefore, unforeseeable.
187. 341 So. 2d at 838-39. See also Shields v. Food Fair Stores, 106 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1958).
188. 341 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
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guard against extraordinary exigencies created when a vehicle
leaves the traveled portion of a roadway out of control." ' 9
An interesting aspect of the duty element was presented in
MacIntyre v. Green's Pool Service, Inc. ' The owner of a building
brought a third party action in a mechanic's lien foreclosure suit to
recover damages for the alleged negligence of an architect in advis-
ing him in the selection of a general contractor who, after undertak-
ing the work, abandoned the project, leaving behind several unpaid
subcontractors.'9 '
In affirming judgment for the architect, the court found that
the architect was under no contractual or statutory duty to provide
the owner with a general contractor. The District Court of Appeal,
Third District, added that the owner made no showing that the
duties alleged were among those normally assumed by or imposed
upon architects under the custom and practice of the business com-
munity.9 2
The issue of informed consent and a physician's duty of disclo-
sure was the gravamen of a patient's complaint in Thomas v.
Berrios."13 In that case, a medical patient brought an action against
her doctor for injuries sustained during the performance of an hys-
terectomy. Shortly after surgery the patient began to suffer from an
infection, which was later determined to have been caused by the
presence of an opening or fistula in the left ureter which permitted
urine to enter the body."' The physician admitted that he did not
advise his patient with respect to the possible problems or complica-
tions which could result from the operation and added that it was
not customary practice in the locality to do so.
Adopting the language of Zebarth v. Swedish Hospital Medical
Center,"' the District Court of Appeal, Second District, emphasized
189. Id. at 833. See also Oram v. New Jersey Bell Tel., 132 N.J. Super. 491, 334 A.2d
343 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975).
190. 347 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
191. Id. at 1083. Additionally, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant architect was
negligent in advising plaintiff as to when and to whom payments were to be made and
negligent in failing to file and to record a notice of commencement with the clerk of the circuit
court, or in the alternative, for failing to advise plaintiff of the necessity to file and record
same. Id.
192. Id.
193. 348 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
194. Id. at 906. The plaintiff thereafter underwent corrective surgery in which the dam-
aged left ureter was attached to the right ureter.
195. 81 Wash. 2d 12, 499 P.2d 1 (1972). The duty of a medical doctor does not encompass
the duty to elucidate upon all of the possible risks but only those of a serious nature, nor does
it presuppose that the patient is completely ignorant in medical metters:
Thus, the information required of the doctor by the general rule is that informa-
tion which a reasonably prudent physician or medical specialist of that medical
1268 [Vol. 32:1233
TORTS
the duty of a physician to advise his patient of all material risks
involved when obtaining consent to an operation or course of treat-
ment. In addition, the court pointed out that the extent of informa-
tion required under the doctrine of informed consent varies with the
particular circumstances of each case."'
Following Ditlow v. Kaplan,"7 the court held that in order to
determine whether a physician has discharged his duty to disclose
material risks under the doctrine of informed consent: "[Ejxpert
testimony is required. . to establish whether a reasonable medical
practitioner in the communtiy would make the pertinent disclosures
under the same or similar circumstances.""' Underlying the expert
witness requirement is the reasoning that the factors involved in
making such a determination are often beyond the knowledge of
ordinary laymen who are uneducated in medicine.'
In Harrell v. Martin,200 a patron of a race track brought an
action against its operators for injuries sustained when a loading
ramp "kicked back" and struck the patron while a race car was
being loaded onto a trailer. The patron predicated his action on
defendants' failure to maintain their premises in a reasonably safe
condition. In addition, the patron alleged that, as a paying specta-
tor, he should not have been allowed in the pit area where automo-
biles were being loaded and that the defendant, in the exercise of
reasonable care, should have supplied an area other than wet grass
for the loading of vehicles.20'
In holding that the proximate cause of the injury was not attrib-
utable to the conduct of the defendants,02 the District Court of
community should or would know to be essential to enable a patient of ordinary
understanding to intelligently decide whether to incur the risk by accepting the
proposed treatment or avoid that risk by foregoing it. A doctor or specialist who
fails to discharge this duty to inform would thus be liable as for negligence to the
patient for the harm proximately resulting from the treatment to which the plain-
tiff submitted.
Id. at 26-27, 499 P.2d at 9-10 (emphasis added). See also Miriam Mascheck, Inc. v. Mausner,
264 So. 2d 859 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972); Bowers v. Talmage, 159 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
196. 348 So. 2d at 905. See also Bly v. Rhoads, 216 Va. 645, 222 S.E.2d 783 (1976).
197. 181 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
198. 348 So. 2d at 908. The Second District noted that its ruling was in accord with the
majority of courts which have considered the issue. Id. (citing Annot., 52 A.L.R.3d 1084
(1973)).
199. Id.
200. 345 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
201. Id. at 869.
202. See also Reynolds v. Deep Sports, Inc., 211 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968); Elmore
v. Sones, 140 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1962); Wometco Theatres Corp. v. Rath, 123 So. 2d 472
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1960). In each of the foregoing cases, it was held that knowledge of the particular
risk was not present. Quoting from Warner v. Florida Jai Alai, Inc., 221 So. 2d 777, 778 (Fla.
4th Dist. 1969), the First District stated that "'[the operator of a place of public entertain-
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Appeal, First District, emphasized that the foreseeability test em-
ployed in reaching its conclusion requires objective rather than
subjective consideration.01
Sabugo v. GDS Drugs, Inc."'4 also involved a negligence action
for injuries sustained by a business invitee. In that case, a customer
established that she had slipped and fallen on paper debris on the
floor of the store. There had not been an inspection by a store
employee for at least three and one-half hours prior to the acci-
dent.205 Following well-settled Florida law, the court held:
The law is clear that if a dangerous condition on the floor of a
business establishment is created by (1) a servant or agent of the
owner or (2) an outsider and the condition is one which has ex-
isted for sufficient length of time that the owner should have
known of it, the owner is liable for any ensuing injuries proxi-




B. Presumptions of Negligence
The standard of due care imposed upon a bailee was explored
in Clermont Marine Sales, Inc. v. Harmon, in which an action was
brought for the loss of a boat delivered to a bailee for repairs. The
bailee alleged that the boat was stolen by unknown third parties.
Acknowledging that a bailee has the burden of showing that he
exercised the degree of care required by the nature of the bail-
ment,28 the District Court of Appeal, Second District, guided itself
ment owes his invitees the duty to use due care to maintain his premises in a reasonably safe
condition commensurate with the activities conducted thereon.' "345 So. 2d at 870 (emphasis
added).
For examples of cases in which liability was imposed or recognized where actual or
constructive knowledge had been held to be present, see Central Theatres, Inc. v. Wilkinson,
154 Fla. 589, 18 So. 2d 755 (1944), and Nance v. Ball, 134 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
203. 345 So. 2d at 870. See also Pinkerton-Hays Lumber Co. v. Pope, 127 So. 2d 441 (Fla.
1961) (indicating that the foreseeability test presupposes an objective standard).
204. 350 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
205. Id. at 23.
206. Id. at 22 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). See also Food Fair Stores, Inc. v.
Trusell, 131 So. 2d 730, 732 (Fla. 1961); Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Patty, 109 So. 2d 5, 6 (Fla.
1959); Carls Markets, Inc. v. Meyer, 69 So. 2d 789, 791-92 (Fla. 1953).
With respect to the so-called "status" of a plaintiff at the time of an injury and the
defendant's duty in relation thereto, see McCabe v. Walt Disney World Co., 350 So. 2d 814
(Fla. 4th Dist. 1977) in which the court noted that "the question of whether ...[the
plaintiff] held the status of a 'public invitee' or that of a 'trespasser' at the moment of injury
[is of particular importance] because the determination of the status defines the scope of
the duty owed. ... Id. at 815.
207. 347 So. 2d 839 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
208. Id. at 841. See also Marine Office-Appleton & Cox Corp. v. Aqua Dynamics, Inc.,
295 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974); Adelman v. M & S Welding Shop, Inc., 105 So. 2d 802
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1958).
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by the settled principle that the delivery of the bailed chattel to a
bailee and his subsequent failure to return it according to the bail-
ment contract gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of negligence
on the part of the bailee for the damage or disappearance of the
chattel"' unless the loss, damage or disappearance is satisfactorily
explained.
No stranger to Florida jurisprudence is the principle of law that
the "rear-ending" of one who is lawfully stopped in traffic creates a
rebuttable presumption of negligence."' Whether the defendant's
explanation is sufficient to rebut the presumption of negligence has
traditionally been regarded as a matter which, under the totality of
circumstances, is within the province of the trier of fact,", who may
find the defendant free from negligence.2"2 This rule was recognized
when the courts adhered to contributory negligence and remains
valid today under the doctrine of comparative negligence.'"
In a recent case decided under section 316.030 of the Florida
Statutes (1975),4 it was held that "a rear-end collision does not
create a rebuttable presumption of guilt under the careless driving
statute.""'
It is also well-settled that once the plaintiff shows that he was
lawfully stopped at the time of the rear-end collision, the presump-
tion of negligence is established and the burden of going forward
with evidence to rebut the presumption shifts to the defendant! 6
209. 347 So. 2d at 841.
210. See, e.g., Gulle v. Boggs, 174 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 1965); Brethauer v. Brassell, 347 So.
2d 656 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977); McNulty v. Cusack, 104 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1958). Contra,
State v. Steele, 348 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
211. Young v. Boyle, 340 So. 2d 939, 940 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
212. See Metropolitan Dade County Transit Auth. v. Espinosa, 344 So. 2d 1290 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1977). The right to find that a driver who rear-ends another vehicle is free from negli-
gence was first recognized in Stark v. Vasquez, 168 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 1964).
213. Metropolitan Dade County Transit Auth., 344 So. 2d 1290, 1291 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977)
(citing Petroleum Carrier Corp. v. Gates, 330 So. 2d 751 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976) and City of St.
Petersburg v. Naden, 284 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973)).
214. FLA. STAT. § 316.030 (1975) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 316.1925 (1977)). This
statute defines careless driving under the Florida Uniform Traffic Control Law, FLA. STAT.
§§ 316.001-.660 (1977), and requires that one operate a motor vehicle "in a careful and
prudent manner. . . so as not to endanger the life, limb, or property of any person." Id. at §
316.1925.
215. State v. Steele, 348 So. 2d 398, 402 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977) (emphasis added). The court
emphasized that each case "must be evaluated on its own facts based on all the attendant
circumstances." Id.
216. Brethauer v. Brassell, 347 So. 2d 656, 657 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977). The cases cited by
the court indicated that the defendant must produce evidence which fairly and reasonably
tends to show that the real fact is not as presumed. In Brethauer, the defendant argued that
his attention was upon the vehicle in front of him. It swerved and passed plaintiff's vehicle
on the median strip. Defendant never saw the plaintiffs car until moments before impact.
The court held that defendant's explanation was no more than a mere description of the
19781
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
C. Proximate Cause
1. GENERALLY
In addition to the elements of duty, breach and damage, the
law of negligence requires that there be a causal connection between
the breach of the duty and the resulting damage. This causal
connection is generally referred to as the proximate cause.,17 This,
of course, presupposes that the defendant's negligence was the ac-
tual cause or "cause in fact" of the plaintiff's injury.21 Generally
stated, proximate cause is that which, in a continuous and natural
sequence of events, unbroken by any efficient intervening agency,
produces the result complained of and without which the result
would not have occurred. A vast majority of jurisdictions, including
Florida, also view reasonable foreseeability of harm as an integral
element of proximate cause. Under that view, a defendant will not
be liable unless the consequence was one which, in light of all cir-
cumstances, a reasonably prudent person would have foreseen as a
result of his negligence. Thus, subsumed under the element of proxi-
mate cause is the subelement of foreseeability.11
The issue of proximate cause was one of the matters addressed
by the Supreme Court of Florida in Helman v. Seaboard Coast Line
Railroad.2 0 In Helman, an automobile passenger sustained injuries
when the vehicle in which she was riding collided with a train at
dusk, on wet roads, and at an intersection which had previously
been recognized as perilous because of a thick growth of trees and
shrubbery which concealed the crossing.2 ' A driver's view would be
obstructed until his car was within seventy-five feet of the crossing.
The jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff based upon the
railroad's negligence in failing adequately to warn of the oncoming
train by emitting a sufficiently audible warning whistle, in traveling
at an excessive rate of speed and in failing to maintain a proper
lookout."' The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, reversed,
finding that the speed at which the train was traveling was not the
proximate cause of the collision, notwithstanding the fact that the
train was exceeding the speed limit prescribed by company rules.
2 3
nature of the defendant's distraction and was not a "substantial or reasonable" explanation
for defendant's failure to avoid the accident. Id.
217. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 42, at 244-50.
218. See generally id. § 41, at 236-44.
219. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928); Memorial
Park, Inc. v. Spinelli, 342 So. 2d 829, 833 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
220. 349 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 1977).
221. Id. at 1188.
222. Id. at 1189.
223. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Helman, 330 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
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In addition, the Fourth District found that failure to maintain a
proper lookout could not have been the proximate cause of the acci-
dent in light of a brakeman'9 testimony that he was watching the
crossing, saw the vehicle and timely called to the engineer who
applied the emergency brakes.
In reinstating the judgment of the trial court, the Supreme
Court of Florida stated:
[tihe question of whether the defendant's negligence was the
proximate cause of the injuries is generally one for the jury unless
reasonable men could not differ in their determination of that
question.
• . . After conceding that respondents were negligent in ex-
ceeding their own speed regulations by five (5) miles per hour, the
District Court concluded that such negligence was not the proxi-
mate cause of the injury. By so concluding, the court substituted
its judgment for the judgment of the jury whose function it was
to determine proximate cause by drawing inferences from the
evidence before it . . . . For the District Court's decision to be
sustained, there needed to be a complete absence of competent
evidence to support the verdict, or, in the alternative, it was
necessary that the evidence be of such a nature that reasonable
men could only conclude that the behavior of the individual driv-
ing petitioner's truck was the sole proximate cause of the acci-
dent. Neither is apparent from the record in the instant cause.'
The question of whether an owner's or contractor's negligence
was the proximate cause of injuries sustained by a third person,
after the owner had accepted the completed project, was addressed
in El Shorafa v. Ruprecht.215 The District Court of Appeal, Fourth
District, followed Slaven v. Kay, 26 which it summarized as follows:
[I]f the offending defect was latent and unknown to the owner,
the contractor remained liable, even after the project was com-
pleted and accepted by the owner. The rationale of that holding
is that the contractor's negligence is the proximate cause of the
injury. The Slaven court held, however, that if the defect were
patent or if the owner learned of it and did not rectify the condi-
tion then the owner's negligence is the proximate cause of the
injury rendering the owner liable and exonerating the contrac-
tor.
2 7
224. 349 So. 2d at 1189-90 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
225. 345 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
226. 108 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 1958).
227. 345 So. 2d at 764; accord, Mai Kai, Inc. v. Colucci, 205 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1967);
Roman Spa, Inc. v. Lubell, 334 So. 2d 298, 299-300 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976); Forte Towers South,
Inc. v. Hill York Sales Corp., 312 So. 2d 512 (Fla, 3d Dist. 1975).
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2. THE CHAIN OF CAUSATION AND THE INDEPENDENT INTERVENING
AGENCY
In Nicholas v. Miami Burglar Alarm Co.,122 the owner of a to-
bacco warehouse brought an action against a burglar alarm com-
pany for its negligence with respect to losses sustained in the bur-
glary of the warehouse. Miami Burglar Alarm Company installed
and maintained an alarm system in the warehouse. Under this sys-
tem, an unauthorized entry into the warehouse was supposed to
trigger an audible as well as silent alarm. The alarm would be trans-
mitted through telephone lines to an answering service which would
then notify Miami Burglar Alarm Company of the signal it received.
The company was then to notify the police or the owner upon notice
of either an alarm or a trouble signal. 2 1 On the night in question,
an employee of the company received notice of a "trouble signal"
when two of the alarm's telephone wires were cut by burglars. No
alarm signal was ever received. In accordance with company policy,
the employee notified the telephone company but did not call the
police or the owner, Nicholas."'
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, labeled the bur-
glary as an intervening criminal act which broke the chain of causa-
tion and held that the original negligence of the burglar alarm com-
pany was, therefore, not the proximate cause of the resulting dam-
ages. 3' The Supreme Court of Florida reversed, reasoning that since
the burglary was foreseeable, it was not an intervening cause of
defendant's losses which would bar recovery. 232 The court stated
that "Florida recognizes the general rule that though a person's
negligence is a cause in fact of another's loss, he will not be liable if
an act unforeseeable to him and independent of his negligence inter-
venes to also cause the loss." 23a Nevertheless, the court refused to
apply literally the general rule and instead followed the principle
expressed in Cooper v. IBI Security Service, Inc. ,231 holding that:
228. 339 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 1976).
'229. Id. at 176. A "trouble signal" indicates that a voltage drop has taken place over the
lines, and could signal no more than a problem with the telephone lines. Although the
contract between the parties required Miami Burglar Alarm Co. to take action only in the
event of an alarm, it was plaintiffs position that the company also assumed the duty to take
action in cases involving trouble signals.
230. Id. The burglars worked uninterrupted and, after knocking a two foot square hole
in the wall, left with over $15,000 worth of cigarettes.
231. Nicholas v. Miami Burglar Alarm Co., 266 So. 2d 64, 66 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
232. 339 So. 2d 175, 177 (Fla. 1976) (citing Nicholas v. Miami Burglar Alarm Co., 297
So. 2d 49, 50 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974) (Haverfield, J., dissenting)).
233. Id. at 177.
234. 281 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
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[Tihe foreseeability in the instant case was sufficient to with-
stand a motion to dismiss for lack of proximate cause. We hold a
burglar alarm company under contract to monitor an alarm sys-
tem may be negligent for failure to inform the police or the ware-
house owner of a trouble signal which its employees had received.
In the instant case there was no system malfunction or sponta-
neous failure. The monitoring employees followed company pol-
icy and directions in handling this telephone circuit disruption
trouble signal in only notifying the telephone company. 35
In Singer v. Durbin, Inc.,3' the Singers brought an action for
damages against companies which had supplied burglar alarm sys-
tems in the home they purchased and with whom they contracted
for monthly service of the alarm system. Notwithstanding obvious
factual distinctions, the District Court of Appeal, Third District,
determined that Nicholas was dispositive of the outcome in Singer.
The Third District noted that a person usually has no reason to
foresee the criminal acts of another, and, if such is the case, it is
usually held that the intervening criminal acts break the chain of
causation. Therefore, the original negligence is precluded from be-
coming the proximate cause of the resulting damage. The court
recognized, however, that:
[T]hose who contract to have a burglar alarm system installed
in a home or building are entitled to the benefit of their bargain,
that is, a properly installed system which provides reasonable
protection of the premises, and not just selected windows or
doors, unless otherwise contracted for.
We hold, therefore, that just as a burglary is foreseeable
where the alarm company's agent fails to notify the police when
a trouble signal is received, a burglary is also foreseeable where
the alarm company is guilty of an omission in not wiring all of
the windows of a home, as contracted for, in order to connect
them to the alarm system."'
In Concord Florida, Inc. v. Lewin,23 an action was filed against
the owner of a cafeteria for injuries suffered as a result of the owner's
failure to provide ample emergency fire exits, failure to designate
clearly the location of existing exits and failure to provide a reasona-
bly safe place for its patrons. Such failures adequately to protect
patrons were violations of the Metropolitan Dade County Fire Pre-
vention and Safety Code." ' The injuries complained of arose out of
235. 339 So. 2d at 177 (emphasis added).
236. 348 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
237. Id. at 372 (emphasis added).
238. 341 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
239. METRO DADE CO., CODE §§ 14-40, -47 (1959).
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a peculiar factual scenario in which an arsonist ran in the front door
of a crowded cafeteria, threw a five gallon container of gasoline on
the floor, lit a match to the gasoline and then ran away. As a result,
many patrons were burned or suffered smoke inhalation while others
were injured in their chaotic attempts to flee the burning building.
24
At the end of the negligence issue of the bifurcated trial, the trial
judge charged the jury with what amounted to a "negligence per se"
instruction2' In the second portion of the bifurcated trial, the owner
was permitted to interpose the defense that the arsonist's interven-
ing act created a break in the chain of proximate causation. The
jury, however, found for the plaintiffs.
The gravamen of the owner's appeal was that it was entitled to
present the question of whether the arsonist's activities were so
foreseeable that the defendants were negligent in not guarding
against such an incident. At the heart of the proposed issue was the
suggestion that the act of the arsonist was an intervening cause
which would insulate the owner from liability.
In affirming the trial court, the District Court of Appeal, Third
District, citing Mozer v. Semenza2 12 and the Restatement (Second)
of Torts, 2 1 reasoned that:
[T]he scope of defendant's duty to maintain reasonably safe
premises does not include a duty to foresee a particular fire but
it does include a duty to reasonably guard against the risk of fire.
Viewed from this standpoint it is not important to the liability
of the appellant whether the fire started in one way or another.
It was reasonably foreseeable that there would, even under mod-
ern conditions, be a likelihood of fire and it was the duty of the
defendant to provide a reasonably safe place in anticipation of
that danger .
2
In both Concord and Mozer, the scope of the risk created was not
that of an arsonist setting fire to a building, per se, but rather the
risk of fire itself. By failing adequately to protect its customers from
the danger of fire, the court held that the owner "assumed the
foreseeable risk that fire might someday trap its patrons leaving
them without an escape route." '45 Viewing the risk as that of fire
240. 341 So. 2d at 243.
241. Id. at 244. The judge instructed the jury as follows: "Violations of the Miami Beach
Fire Code is negligence whether the defendant knew of the existence of the ordinance or not.
If you find that the person alleged to have been negligent violated the ordinance, such person
would be negligent." Id.
242. 177 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
243. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 442B (1965).
244. 341 So. 2d at 244 (quoting Mozer v. Semenza, 177 So. 2d 880, 883 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1965)).
245. Id. at 245.
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itself, the Third District refused to hold that the act of the arsonist,
standing alone, constituted an independent intervening cause which
would serve to insulate the owner from liability.
In the recent case of Vining v. Avis Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc.,4"
the issue certified to the Supreme Court of Florida by the Third
District was whether "the owner of a car, who leaves it unlocked
with the key in the ignition in violation of Florida's Unattended
Motor Vehicle Statute § 316.097 F.S. (1975), is liable for the con-
duct of a thief who steals the car and subsequently injures someone
while operating the stolen vehicle." ' In upholding the trial court's
dismissal of the complaint with prejudice, the Third District rea-
soned that Avis would not be liable for the damages caused by the
thief since the criminal act broke the chain of causation, and that
"therefore, as a matter of law, Avis' negligence was not the proxi-
mate cause of the plaintiff's injuries." 4 '
The Supreme Court of Florida reversed, recognizing that a
number of jurisdictions have eschewed the "traditional approach"
employed in key-in-the-ignition cases." 9 Following the reasoning of
Nicholas v. Miami Burglar Alarm Co. ,25o in the context of a statute 5'
prohibiting one to leave keys in one's car while the vehicle is unat-
tended, the court held that if the plaintiff can establish that the
statutory violation was the proximate cause of his injury, he will be
entitled to recover. The plaintiff was within that class of persons
that the statute was intended to protect, and his injuries were of the
246. 354 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 1977).
247. Id. at 55. FLA. STAT. § 316.097 (1975) (current version at § 316.1975 (1977)) prohibits
a person from leaving his vehicle unattended "without first stopping the engine, locking the
ignition and removing the key." The court noted that the legislature recognized that an
automobile operated by an unauthorized person is more likely to be "operated in a manner
hazardous to the well being of the general public." 354 So. 2d at 56.
248. 354 So. 2d at 55. The Third District placed heavy reliance upon Lingefelt v. Hanner,
125 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1960), which was decided on facts similar to those in Vining.
249. 354 So. 2d at 55. Those jurisdictions outside Florida following the so-called
"traditional approach" have generally denied relief to the injured plaintiff either by holding
that the theft is an independent intervening agency which breaks the chain of causation
between plaintiff and owner or by holding that the owner was never under a duty to the
injured plaintiff in the first instance. See, e.g., Shafer v. Monte Mansfield Motors, 91 Ariz.
331, 372 P.2d 333 (1962); Richards v. Stanley, 43 Cal. 2d 60, 271 P.2d 23 (1954); Liberty v.
Holfeldt, 221 Md. 62, 155 A.2d 698 (1959); Merchants Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Joe Esco Tire
Co., 533 P.2d 601 (Okla. 1975); Clements v. Tashjoin, 92 R.I. 308, 168 A.2d 472 (1961). But
see Gaither v. Meyers, 404 F.2d 216 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Davis v. Thornton, 384 Mich. 138, 180
N.W.2d 11 (1970); Zinck v. Whalen, 120 N.J. Super. 432, 294 A.2d 727 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1972). The Supreme Court of Florida placed heavy reliance upon the reasoning in Zinck for
the proposition that the "key to duty, negligence, and proximate cause" in such a case is the
reasonable foreseeability of harm to other motorists. 354 So. 2d at 55.
250. 339 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 1976); see text accompanying notes 226-33 supra.
251. FLA. STAT. § 316.097 (1975) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 316.1975 (1977)); see
note 247 supra.
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type that the statute was designed to prevent. 211 In concluding that
the plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to state a cause of action, the
supreme court stated:
The key to proximate cause is foreseeability. In light of the facts
alleged by plaintiff, it could be said that a reasonable man should
foresee the theft of an automobile left unattended with the keys
in the ignition in a high crime area. Also, a reasonable man could
foresee the increased danger of injury to the general public using
the highways should such a theft occur. The owner of a dangerous
instrumentality must exercise due care to ensure that such a
danger does not occur."'
XI. THE DANGEROUS INSTRUMENTALITY DOCTRINE
Briefly stated, the dangerous instrumentality doctrine relates
to situations in which a master is held liable when his servant mis-
uses an instrumentality which has been entrusted to him for his own
purposes. The instrumentality must either be highly dangerous or
easily capable of misuse so as to raise a high risk of harm to others.
In general, the doctrine can apply only when the servant is engaged
in his employment and, while so engaged, has custody of the instru-
mentality. It has been stated that the justification for the doctrine
lies "in the especial opportunity and temptation afforded to the
servant to misuse the instrumentality under the conditions likely to
arise in the employment-or in other words, again, the foreseeabil-
ity and indeed especial likelihood of the tort." '254
In Bickley v. Castillo,255 the defendant drove his automobile
into a service station for repairs and entrusted it to a mechanic who,
while road testing the vehicle, became involved in an accident with
the plaintiff. The precise question facing the District Court of Ap-
peal, Third District, was whether "the dangerous instrumentality
doctrine applies to hold an owner of a vehicle liable for damages to
a person injured by said vehicle on the public highway, as a result
of the negligent road testing of the vehicle by a garage repairman,
who maintained both control and custody over the vehicle." ' Find-
252. 354 So. 2d at 56. The supreme court added that the holding of the Third District,
in addition to being in conflict with Nicholas, would logically serve, if followed, to bar
recovery for injured parties under the Florida Unattended Motor Vehicle Statute, FLA. STAT.
§ 316.097 (1975) (current version of FLA. STAT. § 316.1975 (1977)), since the theft necessarily
precedes the injury. Id.
253. 354 So. 2d at 56.
254. W. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 70, at 467.
255. 346 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
256. Id. at 626.
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ing Har/red Auto Repairs, Inc. v. Yaxley251 to be dispositive, the
court held that the dangerous instrumentality doctrine was inap-
plicable. In support of its ratio decidendi, the Third District briefly
articulated the basis for applying the doctrine to automobiles: "The
rationale . . . is founded upon the principle that the dangerous
instrumentality doctrine as applied to automobiles is grounded ex-
clusively upon respondent superior (master-servant), and garage-
men and mechanics are generally independent contractors.'"25 8
Although Bickley did not go as far as Harfred in articulating the
underpinnings of the evolving independent contractor exception to
the dangerous instrumentality doctrine,259 the basic principle is the
same in each case. When an owner places his automobile in the
custody of a repairman and thereafter has no knowledge of or control
over the operation of the vehicle while it is in the repairman's pos-
session, then "[i]n the absence of negligence on the part of the
owner, an independent contractor should be solely liable for negli-
gent operation of the automobile during the period in which it has
custody and control of it." '
XII. THE RESCUE DOCTRINE
Since Perotta v. Tri-State Insurance Co.,2' the rescue doctrine
has been described in the following manner: "[O]ne who is injured
in reasonably undertaking a necessary rescue, may recover for his
personal injuries from the person whose negligence created the peril
necessitating the rescue."2 2 In essence, Florida law recognizes that
"danger" often invites rescue. This doctrine was addressed recently
in Newsome v. Saint Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. ,263 in which the
plaintiff rescuer was attempting to assist two other persons in push-
ing a motor vehicle from a crowded highway when a passing vehicle
struck him. Holding that a jury question was properly presented,
the District Court of Appeal, Second District, explained that "[f]or
the rescue doctrine to come into play the defendant must have been
257. 343 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977); accord, Comer v. Rodriguez, 346 So. 2d 113 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1977).
258. 346 So. 2d at 626 (emphasis added).
259. In Harfred, the First District provides an excellent synopsis of the dangerous instru-
mentality doctrine and the independent contractor exception thereto. The court noted, how-
ever, that the Supreme Court of Florida had not ruled on the independent contractor excep-
tion in the context presented, 343 So. 2d at 81.
260. Id. at 82; accord, Comer v. Rodriguez, 346 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
261. 317 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975), cert. denied, 330 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1976).
262. Id. at 105.
263. 350 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
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negligent, the person (or property) to be rescued must have been in
imminent peril, and the rescuer must have acted reasonably." 2"
XIII. WRONGFUL DEATH
In a case of first impression, the Supreme Court of Florida in
Stern v. Miller"5 was called upon to decide "[w]hether an unborn,
viable child killed as a direct and proximate result of another's
negligence is a 'person' within the intent of section 768.19, Florida
Statutes (1973)."' 1 The issue was first touched upon in Davis v.
Simpson"7 in which the District Court of Appeal, First District, held
that an unborn, viable fetus was not a person for the purposes of the
wrongful death statute. 8' In Stern, the supreme court acknowledged
that this view was contrary to the weight of authority in other juris-
dictions as a result of a rapid growth of tort law in the area of
prenatal injuries."' Recognizing that only eleven states continue to
adhere to the common law requirement of live birth, the supreme
court appeared persuaded by the rationale that favors a cause of
action for the death of a viable but unborn fetus.
Notwithstanding its dissatisfaction with the live birth require-
ment, the supreme court viewed the issue presented in Stern as one
which should be addressed by the legislature.27 Emphasizing the
legislature's awareness of Stokes v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. 7,
at the time it enacted the new Florida Wrongful Death Act,"2 the
court reasoned that the legislature had an ample opportunity to
define further the term "person" since it is presumed to know the
existing law when enacting a statute. Based upon the foregoing and
other factors, the court answered the certified question in the nega-
tive and stated:
The mere reading of the section regarding damages clearly indi-
cates, on the basis of logic, that the legislature did not intend to
264. Id. at 826.
265. 348 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 1977). In Stokes v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 213 So. 2d 695 (Fla.
1968), the court held that a stillborn fetus, prenatally injured by the negligence of a third
person, was not a "minor child" under Florida's former Wrongful Death of Minors Act. FLA.
STAT. § 768.03 (1971) (repealed 1972). In addition, it was expressly stipulated in Stokes that
viability was not an issue.
266. 348 So. 2d at 304. FLA. STAT. §§ 768.16-.27 (1977) are commonly known as the
"Florida Wrongful Death Act." Section 768.19 provides for the right of action against those
persons causing the "wrongful" death of the decedent.
267. 313 So. 2d 796 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
268. FLA. STAT. §§ 768.16-27 (1977).
269. 348 So. 2d at 305 n.4, 306 n.5.
270. Id. at 307.
271. 213 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1968); see note 265 supra.
272. 348 So. 2d at 307. See also 1972 Fla. Laws, ch. 72-35, § 1.
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create a cause of action for a stillborn child. We recognize that
the new Wrongful Death Act is remedial in nature and is to be
construed liberally. However, we cannot construe the statutory
provisions so "liberally" as to reach a result contrary to the clear
intent of the legislature. The act must be construed to be consis-
tent with the objective sought to be accomplished. . . . This
court is without authority to do by statutory construction that
which the legislature has not intended. 73
The issue of viability also was raised in Duncan v. Flynn.27 ' In
Duncan, an action was brought for the death of a baby that could
not be separated successfully from its mother after its head had
emerged from the womb. Concluding that the child could not be
born alive, the attending physicians directed their efforts toward
saving the mother's life and, with her husband's permission, re-
moved the baby's head. The baby's torso was thereafter removed
through Caesarean section.7 ' In their complaint, the parents alleged
that the doctors were negligent in failing to recognize initially that
a Caesarean section would be required. Underlying the action was
the threshold issue of whether a live birth had occurred so as to give
rise to an action for the wrongful death of the child.
Although the issue was one of first impression under Florida
law, the District Court of Appeal, Second District, was guided by
several cases from other jurisdictions that set forth the requirements
for establishing the existence of live birth. 76 The court adopted the
view that a prerequisite to live birth in the context of an action for
wrongful death is the separate and independent existence of the
child from its mother. 77 The Second District went on to state:
This view, we think provides a reasonably definitive test, is logi-
cal, and is supported by the authorities. Generally, the require-
ments of separate and independent existence will be met by a
showing of expulsion (or in a Caesarean section by complete re-
moval) of the child's body from its mother with evidence that the
cord has been cut and the infant has an independent circulation
of blood.278
273. 348 So. 2d at 308.
274. 342 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
275. Id. at 124.
276. Id. at 125-26. Under the prevailing view, live birth requires expulsion from the body
of the mother. See, e.g., Goff v. Anderson, 91 Ky. 303, 15 S.W. 866 (1891). The more recent
cases have concluded that live birth does not take place until the child has been completely
expelled and has attained a separate and independent existence. See generally Annot., 65
A.L.R.3d 413 (1975). It has been thought that this requires that there be an independent
circulation of blood. See also Wehrman v. Farmers' & Merchants' Say. Bank, 221 Iowa 249,
259 N.W. 564 (1935).
277. 342 So. 2d at 126.
278. Id.
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Unlike Stern,27 the court in Duncan followed Stokes"" on the
issue of whether the word "person" 8' or "minor child" '282 includes a
viable full-term fetus not born alive. It concluded that it was not a
person under the wrongful death statute.2"3
The decision in Henderson v. Insurance Co. of North America"
involved the statutory interpretation of the term "survivor" under
the Florida Wrongful Death Act.2M5 In Henderson, the personal rep-
resentative of the decedent's estate brought an action for loss of net
accumulations 8 ' on behalf of four surviving adult children who were
not dependent upon the decedent for support.
In response to the personal representative's contention that the
statutory term "lineal descendants" indicates a legislative intention
not to restrict beneficiaries of that section to minor children, the
District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that adult children,
who were not dependent upon the decedent for support, were not
"survivors" under section 768.21(6)(a).2 87
A different side of the question raised in Henderson was pre-
sented to the Fourth District in Wojcik v. United Services Automo-
bile Association.2 11 The precise issue was whether "parents of a de-
ceased [are] entitled to recover for their mental pain and anguish
as a result of the death of their son where he is not a minor."289 In
Wojcik, an action was brought by the personal representative on
behalf of the mother and father of a decedent killed in an auto
279. 348 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 1977).
280. 213 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1968).
281. See FLA. STAT. § 768.01 (1971) (repealed 1972).
282. See id. § 768.03.
283. 342 So. 2d at 127. The court stated: "We perceive the legislative purpose of the
wrongful death statute being to provide compensation within the ordinary contemplation of
persons who have been born alive." See also Davis v. Simpson, 313 So. 2d 796 (Fla. 1st Dist.
1975).
284. 347 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
285. See FLA. STAT. § 768.18(1) (1975) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 768.18(1) (1977)).
The statute defines survivors as:
[T]he decedent's spouse, minor children, parents, and, when partly or wholly
dependent on the decedent for support or services, any blood relatives and adop-
tive brothers and sisters. It includes the illegitimate child of a mother, but not
the illegitimate child of a father unless the father has recognized a responsibility
for the child's support.
Id.
286. See FLA. STAT. § 768.21(6)(a) (1977). Under this section the decedent's personal
representative may recover decedent's loss of earnings "from the date of injury to the date of
death, less lost support of survivors." In addition, "[i]f the decedent's survivors include a
surviving spouse or lineal descendants, loss of net accumulations beyond death and reduced
to present value may also be recovered."
287. 347 So. 2d at 692.




accident. Damages predicated upon loss of services and pain and
suffering were sought. The personal representative maintained that
by consolidating survival and wrongful death actions into the new
Florida Wrongful Death Act,10 the legislature intended to allow a
decedent's survivors to recover damages for their own pain and suf-
fering in lieu of that recognized under the former survival statute 9'
for the decedent's pain and suffering prior to his death. In enacting
the Florida Wrongful Death Act, ' the legislature continued to rec-
ognize the decedent's loss of earnings, medical expenses and funeral
expenses as recoverable damages but eliminated the claim for a
decedent's pain and suffering from the time of injury to the time of
death by replacing it with a claim for the pain and suffering of
"close relatives." The question properly before the court, therefore,
was whether the parents of an adult decedent are "close relatives"
under the Florida Wrongful Death Act.
In construing the term "close relatives" as not including the
parents of an adult decedent, the Fourth District stated:
A fair reading of the cited cases in the Florida Wrongful Death
Act leaves little doubt in our mind that the term "close relatives"
initially used by Chief Justice Overton in Martin was not in-
tended to be an accurate specification of the persons who can
recover pain and suffering for wrongful death. In context "close
relatives" is a collective phrase intended to describe certain sur-
vivors whom the Act authorizes to recover for pain and suffering,
viz., a surviving spouse, minor children of the decedent, and each
parent of a deceased minor child, 768.21(4).13
The court went on to emphasize that the Supreme Court of
Florida, in Bassett v. Merlin,9 ' resolved the question whether the
surviving parents of adult offspring have the right to recover dam-
ages for their own mental pain and suffering by ruling that section
768.21 was constitutional even though "it denied parents of an adult
child the right to damages for mental pain and suffering." '95
In another case of first impression, the District Court of Appeal,
Fourth District, in Wilcox v. Jones, ' determined that the Florida
Wrongful Death Act permits the father of an illegitimate child to
recover damages for his child's wrongful death. In arriving at its
290. 1972 Fla. Laws, ch. 72-35 § 1 (current version at FLA. STAT. §§ 768.16-.27 (1977)).
291. FLA. STAT. § 768.03 (1971) (repealed 1972).
292. 1972 Fla. Laws, ch. 72-35 §§ 1, 2 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 768.16-.27 (1977)).
293. 347 So. 2d at 1052.
294. 335 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 1976).
295. Id. at 274.
296. 346 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
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determination, the court relied upon the language of the Florida
Wrongful Death Act, the decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States in Trimball v. Gordon297 and a growing trend toward
the recognition of the rights of the illegitimate father. In addition,
the Fourth District was careful to avoid potential equal protection
problems by emphasizing that the natural mother has been recog-
nized as a parent of an illegitimate child within the statute.29 Ac-
knowledging that the Florida Wrongful Death Act lends itself to a
liberal construction, the court concluded:
To recognize the right of a natural mother of an illegitimate child
to maintain a wrongful death action but in the same breath to
refuse to recognize the corresponding right of the natural father,
would violate the equal protection clauses of the state and Fed-
eral constitutions. "The father is no more nor less guilty of immo-
rality than is the mother." 9 '
Whether evidence that a decedent intended to divorce his wife
is admissible in a wrongful death action brought on behalf of the
widow was addressed for the first time under Florida law in Adkins
v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co.300 In Adkins, it was held that
such evidence would be admissible as probative of the decedent's
"intent and probable future actions" in assessing the survivor's
damages, in light of the statute's provision for recovery of both
sentimental and economic losses. Additionally, the District Court of
Appeal, Second District, held that evidence of domestic discord is
logically relevant in ascertaining the extent of the survivor's mental
pain and suffering and loss of companionship and protection.30 The
court reasoned that a contrary ruling would "authorize the perpetra-
tion of fraud upon the jury"302 and, relying on Florida Central &
Peninsular Railroad Co. v. Foxworth,03 stressed the necessity of
297.. 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
298. 346 So. 2d at 1038.
299. Id.
300. 351 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
301. Id. at 1093. FLA. STAT. § 768.21 (1975) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 768.21
(1977)), articulates the nature of the damages recoverable by the potential beneficiaries in
an action for wrongful death.
It should be noted that in reaching its conclusion the court relied upon Collins v. Florida
Towing Corp., 262 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972), which the court viewed as analogous to
Adkins. In Collins, the father of a deceased minor sought damages or the "intense mental
pain and anguish" allegedly resulting from the child's death. In assessing damages, the First
District held that evidence of the father's abandonment of the child and mother as admissible
on the question of the extent of mental pain and anguish suffered and that the father's regard
for the welfare of his child 'was properly considered by the jury.
302. 351 So. 2d at 1093.
303. 41 Fla. 1, 25 So. 338 (1899).
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allowing the presentation of "an honest and accurate picture of the
marriage relationship.
304
XIV. INDEMNITY AND CONTRIBUTION
A. Indemnity
It is well-settled that the obligation to indemnify is predicated
upon an express" 5 or implied contractual relationship between tort-
feasors205 In addition, it has been recognized that the violation of a
duty owed by a third party defendant who is actively negligent to a
third party plaintiff who is passively negligent can give rise to an
implied contractual obligation to indemnify. 07 In proceeding
against a third party defendant, a third party plaintiff is not con-
fined to the plaintiff's version of the facts as asserted in the com-
plaint but is instead permitted to present his own allegation of fact
from which all reasonable inferences will be deemed admitted for
the purpose of a motion to dismiss.0
It has been held that an indemnitee's rights are determined by
actual wrongdoing and not by mere allegations thereof.0 As stated
by the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, in Insurance Co.
of North America v. King: "A plaintiff should not be able to arbi-
trarily deprive a defendant of his right to indemnification from a
third party by alleging that he was actively negligent when in fact
304. 351 So. 2d at 1093. The court noted that its decision was in accord with the trend
of authority. See, e.g., Peterson v. Pete-Erickson Co., 244 N.W. 68 (Minn. 1932); Allen v.
Riedel, 425 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. Ct. App. 1968). See generally Annot., 79 A.L.R.2d 819 (1968).
305. See Kressley-Davis, Inc. v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 340 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1976).
306. First Church of Christ Scientist v. City of St. Petersburg, 344 So. 2d 1302, 1304 (Fla.
2d Dist. 1977).
307. Id. See also Florida Power Corp. v. Taylor, 332 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976);
Stuart v. Hertz Corp., 302 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
The Second District noted in First Church that an implied contractual duty to indemnify
has been fashioned from the violation of a duty owed to the third party plaintiff by the third
party defendant and also the third party plaintiff's passive negligence as compared to the
third party defendant's active negligence. 344 So. 2d at 1304.
Addressing the nature and consequence of the active-passive negligence distinction, the
Third District recently stated:
In order for appellant, as a subcontractor, to have been held liable to the
contractor-defendant for indemnification, pursuant to the third party complaint,
a jury would have to find appellant actively negligent and the defendant-
contractor passively negligent. . . . As an actively negligent tortfeasor then, ap-
pellant could not pursue a cause of action in indemnity against appellees . . .
notwithstanding the admitted absence of either an express or implied contract
between appellant and appellees.
Florida Rock & Sand Co. v. Cox, 344 So. 2d 1296, 1298 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
308. 344 So. 2d at 1303.
309. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. King, 340 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
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the defendant is found not to have been actively negligent. ' 310
Once the right to indemnification has been established, an in-
demnitee is entitled to recover attorney's fees and reasonable and
proper legal costs and expenses which he is compelled to pay as a
result of actions by or against him with reference to the matter
against which he is indemnified.
B. Contribution
In New Hampshire Insurance Co. v. Petrik,12 the issue raised
on appeal was whether a court, as a matter of law, must dismiss a
third party action for contribution brought by a defendant against
a third party not named by the plaintiff as a party-defendant. Un-
like Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Fouts,' 3 in which the trial
court resolved the identical issue in favor of third party practice as
a means of achieving contribution, the trial court in Petrik held that
section 768.31(4)(d) of the Florida Statutes precludes the use of
third party practice as a means of effecting contribution.' 4 In re-
versing the trial court, the District Court of Appeal, First District,
expanded the reasoning set forth in Nationwide by addressing the
issue in the interrelated context of the Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act and the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure regarding
third party practice."'
Carefully avoiding the trial court's emphasis on section
768.31(4)(d), the First District instead focused upon the language
of section 768.31(4)(a),"' which it viewed as affecting contribution
310. Id. at 1176.
311. Id.
312. 343 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
313. 323 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975). In Nationwide, the District Court of Appeal,
Second District, dealt with the same question as that addressed in Petrik. Unlike Petrik,
Nationwide relied on FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.180 and the Commissioner's comments to the Uniform
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, FLA. STAT. § 768.31 (1977), as reflecting Florida's inten-
tion to provide for the enforcement of contribution by way of third party practice.
314. New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Petrik, 343 So. 2d at 48; see FLA. STAT. § 768.31(4)(d)
(1977), which states in pertinent part:
If there is no judgment for the injury or wrongful death against the tortfeasor
seeking contribution, his right of contribution is barred unless he has either:
1. Discharged by payment the common liability within the statute of limitations
period applicable to claimant's right of action against him and has commenced
his action for contribution within 1 year after payment, or
2. Agreed, while the action is pending against him, to discharge the common
liability and has within 1 year after the agreement paid the liability and comm-
enced his action for contribution.
315. 343 So. 2d at 49-50; FLA. STAT. § 768.31 (1977); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.180.
316. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(4)(a) (1975) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 768.31(4)(a) (1977))
reads in pertinent part: "Whether or not judgment has been entered in an action against two
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by way of a separate action as a procedural alternative to third party
practice. The court reasoned that: (1) the drafters had left the en-
forcement of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act to
the states; (2) the Supreme Court of Florida had approved the use
of third party practice; and (3) the proposed method had won ap-
proval in other jurisdictions."7 The absence of a provision relating
to the use of third party practice to effect3"8 contribution, therefore,
would not be fatal.
In Best Sanitary Disposal v. Little Food Town, Inc. ,31 an action
was brought against the owner of a refuse disposal container and the
landlord and tenant of the property on which it was located on
behalf of a minor who was injured while playing on the container.
Thereafter, crossclaims were filed. After the landlord, tenant and
their insurer settled with the plaintiff, the jury returned a verdict
against the tenant and the owner. The tenant then filed a motion
for contribution, seeking reimbursement from the owner for one-half
of the judgment.2 0
Under the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, one
of several persons liable in tort for the same injury has a right to
recover from the other tortfeasors whatever he has paid in excess of
his pro rata share of the common liability.2 ' Of particular signifi-
cance is that section of the Act which appears to preclude a joint
tortfeasor from recovering contribution in an action where he enters
or more tortfeasors for the same injury or wrongful death, contribution may be enforced by
separate action."
317. The Petrik court listed cases from other jurisdictions which had approved third
party practice as a method for achieving contribution under the Act. Such states include New
Jersey, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Mexico, North Carolina and Rhode Island. 343 So.
2d at 50.
318. Id. The First District added:
The logic is recognized that to allow such a procedure efficiently conserves the
court's time, effort, expense, and provides consistency of result wherein the action
which establishes the plaintiff's right to recovery also establishes against whom
that recovery should be made. The same jury that "understands" the plaintiff's
case should also be permitted to relate why it found in favor of the plaintiffs by
naming the defendants against whom recovery should be made. If there is no
recovery for the plaintiff, there can be no right of contribution. ...
The Florida Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act does not prohibit
the third party practice recognized by the Supreme Court in the Florida Rules of
Civil Procedure. Since the establishment of procedure is peculiarly a judicial
function and because of the implicit logic that the same jury which assesses
recovery for the plaintiff should also assess against whom such recovery is made,
the third party action for contribution against a party not made a defendant..
is not prohibited as a matter of law. . ..
Id.
319. 339 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
320. Id. at 225.
321. FLA. STAT. § 768.31 (1977).
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into a settlement with a claimant and the other tortfeasor's liability
is not also extinguished by the settlement.2 2
The owner argued that the tenant was not entitled to contribu-
tion since it settled with the plaintiffs without also obtaining an
extinguishment of the owner's liability to the plaintiffs. The tenant,
on the other hand, argued that since the amount it agreed to pay
would be deducted from any verdict obtained against the owner
under section 768.31(5)(a) of the Florida Statutes,323 the effect of
this was equivalent to an extinguishment of the owner's liability.
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, did not agree
that the language of section 768.31(5) could be read to equate a
reduction in the amount of the claim against the owner to the extin-
guishment of the owner's liability and noted that when one of sev-
eral tortfeasors settles a claim, that tortfeasor is relieved of liability
for contribution to any other tortfeasor. Viewing subsections (1)(d)
and (4)(b) of the Act as presenting "opposite sides of the same
coin,"32' the court stated:
Thus, if tortfeasor A (Little Food Town) settles out and tortfeasor
B (Best) elects to go to trial and suffers a large verdict, Section
(4)(b) protects tortfeasor A from any claim for contribution by
tortfeasor B. However, at the same time section (1)(d) provides
that if tortfeasor A (Little Food Town) buys its peace before trial
without absolving tortfeasor B (Best) from all further responsibil-
ity, then tortfeasor A cannot later obtain contribution from tort-
feasor B. This is borne out by the comment of the Commissioners
under Section (4) of the uniform act. "
As a result, it was held that the tenant absolutely limited its
liability to $45,000 by virtue of the agreement and that the tenant's
payment of a disproportionate amount of the plaintiffs' claim was
a circumstance of its own making for which it was not entitled to
receive contribution.
Prior to the enactment of the Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act, it was well-settled that a codefendant could not
322. Id. § 768.31(2)(d) (1977) reads:
A tortfeasor who enters into a settlement with a claimant is not entitled to recover
contribution from another tortfeasor whose liability for the injury or wrongful
death is not extinguished by the settlement or in respect to any amount paid in
a settlement which is in excess of what was reasonable.
323. FtA. STAT. § 768.31(5)(a) (1975) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 768.31(5)(a) (1977))
provides that a release or covenant not to sue, given in good faith, will not discharge other
tortfeasors unless it so provides, but that it will reduce the claim against the others to the
extent of any amount stipulated by the release or the covenant or in the amount of the
consideration paid for it, whichever is greater.




challenge a verdict rendered in favor of another codefendant since
there was no common law right to contribution.32 In Northshore
Hospital v. Martin,32 this issue was reexamined in light of the Flor-
ida Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act"' and the division
of authority between jurisdictions which had addressed the issue. 2
Adopting an approach similar to that taken in New York and
California,330 the District Court of Appeal, Third District, noted that
the contribution statute had not changed the existing rule that a
party has no right of appeal from judgment favoring a codefendant
and that the right of contribution was wholly dependent upon the
"presence of specific statutory conditions."33 ' Emphasizing that
"common liability" is a prerequisite to the right of contribution, the
Third District concluded: "If the legislature had intended to allow
a defendant to appeal the exoneration of a codefendant whose liabil-
ity was not actively pursued by the complaining party, it would




Since the constitutionality of the Florida Medical Malpractice
Reform Act 333 was upheld in Carter v. Sparkman,34 a series of cases
regarding the medical mediation provisions of the Act have arisen.
The question of whether a circuit judge, sitting as a judicial
326. See Jackson v. Florida Weathermakers, Inc., 55 So. 2d 575, 577 (Fla. 1951); Cren-
shaw Bros. Produce Co. v. Harper, 142 Fla. 27, 194 So. 353 (1940).
327. 344 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
328. FLA. STAT. § 768.31 (Supp. 1976) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 768.31 (1977)).
329. See, e.g., Bocchi v. Karnstedt, 238 Minn. 257, 56 N.W.2d 628 (1953) (codefendant
permitted to challenge a verdict rendered in favor of another codefendant); Eller v. Crowell,
238 S.W.2d 310 (Mo. 1951) (appealing defendant could not complain of alleged error in a
codefendant's instruction to the jury); Hutcherson v. State, 105 W. Va. 184, 142 S.E. 444
(1928).
330. Both California and New York have addressed the effect of a contribution statute
upon the question of a codefendant's purported right to challenge a verdict rendered in favor
of another codefendant and have concluded that the statute does not change the preexisting
view disfavoring appeals from judgments rendered in favor of codefendants. See, e.g., Augus-
tus v. Bean, 56 Cal. 2d 270, 363 P.2d 873 (1961); Guy F. Atkinson Co. v. Consani, 223 Cal.
App. 2d 342, 35 Cal. Rptr. 750 (Ct. App. 1964); Wolfson v. Darnell, 12 N.Y.2d 819, 236
N-.Y.S.2d 67, 187 N.E.2d 133 (1962); Ward v. Iroquois Gas Corp., 258 N.Y. 124, 179 N.E. 317
(1932).
331. 344 So. 2d at 258.
332. Id.
333. FLA. STAT. § 768.40-.54 (1977).
334. 335 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977); accord, Berman v.
Duane, 341 So. 2d 996 (Fla. 1976).
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referee, has the authority to alter the ten month time limit for
medical mediation was raised in State ex rel. McGuirk v. Cowart.335
In McGuirk, a request for medical mediation was filed on a medical
malpractice claim pursuant to statute."3 6 Thereafter, the relator
challenged the constitutionality of the statute. The circuit court
dismissed the request for medical mediation and transferred the
cause to the circuit court. In the interim, the Supreme Court of
Florida, in Carter v. Sparkman,337 declared the statute to be consti-
tutional, and the circuit .court then reinstated the medical media-
tion claim. The claimant then alleged that the ten month time limit
under the statute had expired and that a fortiori the panel lost its
jurisdiction to proceed. Relying in part on State of Florida ex rel.
Mercy Hospital v. Vann,33 the District Court of Appeal, Third Dis-
trict, held that medical defendants should not be deprived of media-
tion and that the circuit court's order disinissing the claim and
transferring the cause to the circuit court was unauthorized and
void, stating that:
[T]here still adheres to the mediation panel the time which
remained on the ten month statutory period at the time the unau-
thorized order was entered.
335. 344 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
336. FLA. STAT. § 768.44(1)(a) (Supp. 1976) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 768.44(1)(a)
(1977)). The section requires that any person claiming damages for malpractice "submit such
claim to an appropriate medical liability mediation panel before that claim may be filed in
any court of this state." The time limitations of the Act are found in § 768.44(3) which reads
in pertinent part, as follows:
The hearing shall be held within 120 days of the date the claim was filed with
the clerk unless, for good cause shown upon order of the judicial referee, such time
is extended. Such extension shall not exceed 6 months from the date the claim is
filed. If no hearing on the merits is held within 10 months of the date the claim
is filed, the jurisdiction of the mediation panel on the subject matter shall termi-
nate, and the parties may proceed in accordance with law.
337. 335 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1976).
338. 342 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977). In Mercy Hospital, the hospital sought a writ
of mandamus to compel the medical mediation panel to proceed in a case in which the hos-
pital was a defendant. Under the facts in Mercy Hospital, a mediation panel was appointed
but was thereafter stayed by the circuit judge, who was also the judicial referee of the panel,
pending the Supreme Court of Florida's determination as to the constitutionality of the Act.
After the Act was held constitutional in Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802, cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1041 (1977), the hospital moved for dissolution of the order staying the proceedings.
Thereafter, the circuit judge signed an order stating that the mediation panel was without
jurisdiction on the ground that the case had been pending for a period of longer than 10
months.
Limiting its holding to the specific facts before it, the Third District held:
The circuit judge who has by his own action in the stay order and over the
objection of the defendant rendered the progress of the mediation panel impossi-
ble, has a duty now to proceed with the cause based upon the concept that a party
• . . may not be deprived of a valuable legal right without due process of law.
342 So. 2d at 1075.
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. . The ten month statutory limit for holding medical mal-
practice mediation hearings is clear and unequivocal. It should
be rigidly enforced so as to mitigate the plaintiffs pre-litigation
burden imposed by the Act.3 '
Although the statute provides for a hearing on the merits within
120 days from the filing of the claim and for extensions up to six
months for good cause shown, when more than six months passes
and there has been no hearing on the merits, a claimant's motion
to terminate should be denied even if there is no extension for up
to ten months from the filing of the claim. As stated in State ex rel.
Love v. Jacobson:14
The statute, by providing that if there is no hearing on the merits
within ten months of the date the claim is filed the jurisdiction
of the mediation panel terminates, thus provided that jurisdic-
tion of the panel to holding a hearing on the merits necessarily
extended until the expiration of such ten month period.
4'1
Notwithstanding the language of the statute, it has been held
that where one files but fails to prosecute his claim for medical
mediation due to inadvertance and not to design or to neglect, the
court may stay a medical malpractice action pending under the
order of trial court . 4 The situation differs from that in which a
hospital fails to take affirmative action during the 120 day period
following the filing of a claim for medical mediation. 4 3 In the latter
case, the court in Mercy Hospital, Inc. v. Badia,44 noted:
[Tihe statute should be strictly construed against those seeking
the benefits of it, the statute being in derogation of the normal
right of a claimant to seek immediate redress in the courts. This
pre-litigation burden was recognized by the Supreme Court of
Florida . . . which upheld the constitutionality of these stat-
utes. 34
15
In Mercy Hospital, the Third District affirmed the judicial referee's
position that he was without jurisdiction to grant an extension
request after the expiration of the 120 day period, and held that the
339. Id. at 626-27.
340. 343 So. 2d 1328 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977); accord Limond v. Llanio, 349 So. 2d 214 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1977).
341. 343 So. 2d at 1328 (emphasis added).
342. Richards v. Foulk, 345 So. 2d 402 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
343. Mercy Hosp., Inc. v. Badia, 348 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
344. Id.
345. Id. at 632.
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claimant was free to pursue its claim in circuit court without further
delay.3"
It has been held that where a hospital files a third party com-
plaint against a physician for contribution or indemnity during the
pendency of a malpractice action which was brought before the
effective date of the statute, the hospital's third party claim against
the physician is exempt from the mediation requirement" ' since the
third party complaint was procedurally authorized and, therefore,
a part of the case.348
1. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The statute of limitations regarding medical malpractice ac-
tions"9 has generated controversy in the area of retroactive applica-
tion of its provisions.
In Foley v. Morris,3 0 the petitioner filed his complaint against
Dr. Morris on September 17, 1974, alleging that the physician left
a rubber drain in his body during surgery performed on April 14,
1971. The drain had been removed in September, 1971.51 The doctor
sought dismissal on the ground that the action was barred by the
recent two year statute of limitations rather than the four year
statute of limitations which was in effect at the time the cause of
action accrued.
Refusing to hold the new statute of limitations applicable to the
case before it, the Supreme Court of Florida recognized that the
lower court, in effect, retroactively applied the new statute in a
manner contrary to the intent of the legislature. After reviewing the
new statute, the court stated: "Nothing in the language of the act
manifests an intention by the Legislature to do otherwise than pro-
spectively apply the new two-year statute of limitations."35 ' The
346. Id. See Riccobono v. Cordis Corp., 341 So. 2d 805, 806 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977) in which
the court stated the policy underlying the Act as follows:
This statute clearly provides that prior to filing a malpractice claim in the circuit
court, the complainant must submit such claim to a medical liability mediation
panel. Plaintiff having failed to submit his claim to a mediation panel, the trial
judge was eminently correct in entering the order of dismissal.
347. See Mt. Sinai Hosp., Inc. v. Mora, 342 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977); accord,
O'Grady v. White, 345 So. 2d 358 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
348. 342 So. 2d at 1064.
349. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(b) (1977). The statute requires that the action be commenced
within two years from the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or within two
years from the time the incident is discovered or should have been discovered in the exercise
of due diligence, but in no event shall the action be commenced later than four years from
the date of the incident or occurrence out of which the cause of action accrued.
350. 339 So. 2d 215 (Fla. 1976).
351. Id. at 216. This would be the date on which the plaintiff's cause of action "accrued."
352. Id. at 217.
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supreme court adopted the following as a part of its ratio decidendi:
Where the Legislature has not sufficiently manifested its intent
whether a statute of limitations should apply retrospectively or
should apply prospectively only, the question is passed onto the
courts to determine, as a matter of construction, in which of these
ways the statute should apply. In most jurisdictions, in the ab-
sence of a clear manifestation of legislative intent to the contrary,
statutes of limitation are construed as prospective and not re-
trospective in their operation, and the presumption is against any
intent on the part of the legislature to make such a statute retro-
active*. . ..
2. RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
In a case of original jurisdiction, the Supreme Court of Florida,
in In re: The Florida Bar, Rules of Civil Procedure," approved
certain amendments to the discovery provisions of the Rules of Civil
Procedure in connection with the proposed rules of medical media-
tion procedure. The recent amendments allow depositions taken in
a medical liability mediation proceeding and answers to interroga-
tories propounded in a medical liability mediation proceeding to be
used in a subsequent civil action as if the deposition was originally
taken or the interrogatories originally propounded for it."'5
3. OTHER MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES
In Sims v. Helms,38 the Supreme Court of Florida answered the
question of whether expert testimony is required in determining
whether a doctor properly proceeded in an "emergency situation."
Acknowledging that "[n]egligence cannot be inferred from the
fact that the surgery was unsuccessful or terminated in unfortunate
results," '357 the court followed the authority of O'Grady v.
Wickman35 and held that where the method of treatment is chal-
lenged, expert testimony is required.3"9
353. Id. (quoting 51 AM. Jur. 2D Limitation of Actions § 57 (1970)); accord, Reinhardt
v. Schwab, 343 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 1977); Fishman v. Crane, 340 So. 2d 1274 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
354. 348 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 1977).
355. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.330(a)(6), 1.340(f).
356. 345 So. 2d 721 (Fla. 1977).
357. Id. at 723.
358. 213 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968). The court also noted that "the overwhelming
weight of authority [in other jurisdictions] supports this view." 345 So. 2d at 724.
359. Id. at 723.
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B. Attorney Malpractice
In a case of first impression, the District Court of Appeal,
Fourth District, in McAbee v. Edwards,"' addressed the issue of an
attorney's liability to an intended beneficiary under a will for erro-
neously advising the testatrix that it would not be necessary for her
to redraft the will after her remarriage in order to ensure that her
daughter would remain the sole beneficiary of her estate. 6 ' As a
result of the attorney's advice, his client's widower successfully
claimed an interest in the estate as a pretermitted spouse, which led
to a settlement of $27,000 with the estate. The plaintiff beneficiary
brought an action against the defendant attorney based upon negli-
gence and breach of contract.
Recognizing a division of authority on the question presented,
the court followed a line of California cases" ' and noted that the
better view favors a cause of action in favor of the intended benefici-
ary. The Fourth District quoted with approval language from Heyer
v. Flaig,63 a case handed down by the Supreme Court of California:
[In a prior case,] we embraced the position that an attorney who
erred in drafting a will could be held liable to a person named in
the instrument who suffered deprivation of benefits as a result of
the mistake. Although we stated that the harmed party could
recover as an intended third-party beneficiary of the attorney-
client agreement providing for legal services, we ruled that the
third-party could also recover on a theory of tort liability for a
breach of duty owed directly to him. "
Accordingly, the Fourth District held that an attorney owes an in-
tended testamentary beneficiary of an estate the duty properly to
advise the testatrix of the necessity of changing her will after remar-
riage in order to effect her intended disposition. In so doing, the
court adopted a "balancing of factors" test. The Fourth District
stated:
[Tihe determination whether in a specific case the defendant
will be held liable to a third person not in privity is a matter of
policy and involves the balancing of various factors, among which
are the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the
plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of certainty
360. 340 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
361. Id. at 1168.
362. See, e.g., Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 223, 449 P.2d 161, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969);
Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961); Biakanja v. Irving,
49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
363. 70 Cal. 2d 223, 449 P.2d 161, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969).
364. 340 So. 2d at 1169.
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that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection
between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the
moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, and the policy
of preventing future harm." 5
Underlying this determination, the court approved the California
rationale regarding foreseeability and stated: "A reasonably pru-
dent attorney should appreciate the consequences of a post-
testamentary marriage, advise the testator of such consequences,
and use good judgment to avoid them if the testator so desires. In
the present case, defendant allegedly knew that the testatrix wished
to avoid such consequences.""3 '
The statute of limitations on a cause of action for an attorney's
negligence accrues when the client has notice or knowledge of the
negligent act"7 since "[i]t is impossible to rationalize how an in-
jured client can be required to institute an action within a limited
time after his cause of action accrues if he has no means of knowing
by the exercise of reasonable diligence that the cause of action ex-
ists."",g
In Henzel v. Fink,36 the District Court of Appeal, Third Dis-
trict, applied this standard to hold that a client was chargeable with'
notice of alleged errors at or shortly after trial so as to preclude him
from maintaining an action against his attorney some seven years
after his conviction. Henzel makes it clear that, under some circum-
stances, one may be obligated to use "reasonable diligence" in ap-
prising oneself of one's rights against one's attorneys.
370 I
The unique question of the liability of a seller's attorney to an
unrepresented buyer in a real estate transaction for negligent errors
favoring the seller in a closing statement was presented in Adams
v. Chenowith.3 71 Noting that the attorney was ethically precluded
from representing both parties" 2 and that the buyer was free to hire
his own attorney, the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District,
acknowledged that the attorney's allegiance was solely to the seller.
In holding that a buyer cannot hold the seller's attorney liable for
365. Id. at 1169.
366. Id. at 1170.
367. Edwards v. Ford, 279 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 1973); Green v. Adams, 343 So. 2d 636 (Fla.
4th Dist. 1977); Henzel v. Fink, 340 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976), cert. denied, 348 So. 2d
948 (Fla. 1977).
368. Edwards v. Ford, 279 So. 2d 851, 853 (Fla. 1973) (quoting Downing v. Vaine, 228
So. 2d 622, 625 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969)).
369. 340 So. 2d 1262, 1263 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976), cert. denied, 348 So. 2d 948 (Fla. 1977).
370. Id. at 1264.
371. 349 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
372. See, e.g., FLORIDA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILrrY EC 514.
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negligence in preparing a closing statement, the court stated: "[i]f
anyone was negligent then no one was more negligent than the buyer
in failing to take any minimum steps to complete this business deal
in a proper fashion." ' The court concluded that where there are two
interests to be protected, it cannot hold an attorney liable to all
parties in the transaction unless it is alleged that he committed
some nonnegligent tort such as fraud or theft.37 ' This is not the case,
however, where an attorney acts in a patently negligent manner
towards his own client by failing, for example, to file a claim in
timely fashion.375
An attorney's duty can become confusing, however, in circum-
stances such as those set forth in Amsler v. American Home Assur-
ance Co."' In that case, certain limited partners brought an action
against an attorney for failing to obtain their written consent prior
to recording certain financing documents with respect to partner-
ship property. After examining the language of section 26 of the
Uniform Limited Partnership Act 37 and finding that the plaintiffs
failed properly to allege the element of duty, the District Court of
Appeal, Fourth District, followed the Washington case of
Lieberman v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co.375 and concluded that
the limited partner plaintiffs lacked standing to institute the suit.
The court emphasized that any duty owing to the plaintiffs would
be owed to the entire membership of the limited partnership, and,




In Wamser v. City of St. Petersburg,30 the plaintiff brought an
action against the city and its carrier for injuries sustained as a
result of a shark attack while swimming in waters adjacent to a
beach operated by the City of Treasure Island. Although the city
had received reports of shark sightings on several occasions, each
sighting proved to be porpoises. The District Court of Appeal, Sec-
373. 349 So. 2d at 231.
374. Id.
375. See, e.g., Tobin v. Witherspoon, 342 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
376. 348 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
377. FLA. STAT. § 620.26 (1975) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 620.26 (1977)). Section
620.26 reads as follows: "A contributor, unless he is a general partner, is not a proper party
to proceedings by or against a partnership, except where the object is to enforce a limited
partner's right against or liability to the partnership."
378. 62 Wash. 2d 922, 385 P.2d 53 (1963).
379. 348 So. 2d 71.
380. 339 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
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ond District, found that there was nothing in the record to indicate
that the city had any knowledge of a shark hazard or that an attack
should have been expected.38" ' In holding that the city was under no
duty to guard against the shark attack, the court stated:
We have found no Florida case dealing with the owners' or posses-
sors' liability for injuries inflicted by wild animals in their natural
habitat. The rule is that generally the law does not require the
owner or possessor of land to anticipate the presence of or guard
an invitee against harm from animals ferae naturae unless such
owner or possessor has reduced the animals to possession, harbors
such animals, or has introduced onto his premises wild animals
not indigenous to the locality.
. . . In the absence of reasonable foreseeability of the dan-
ger, there was no duty on the part of the city to guard an invitee
against an attack by an animal ferae naturae, or to warn of such
an occurrence. . . . Nor was the city under a duty to obtain
information from local agencies to determine the frequency with
which sharks appeared in and around the beach area, since there
was no attack on record in the history of the beach to indicate
the necessity for obtaining such information."'
In O'Steen v. Kemmerer,"3 the issue facing the District Court
of Appeal, First District, was whether liability for injuries caused by
wild monkeys may be
imposed upon an owner of real property for damages sustained
on the property of another as a result of wild animals negligently
maintained on the former's property by an occupant who is either
an agent or employee of the property owner in the absence of
some interest or relationship between the property owner and the
wild animals or other dangerous instrumentality? 8'
Distinguishing Christie v. Anchorage Yacht Haven, Inc.,'" on
the ground that the injuries in O'Steen were sustained on the plain-
tiff's rather than the defendant's property, the court refused to hold
the defendant landowner liable in the absence of some interest or
relationship between the owner and the wild animal.
In Mapoles v. Mapoles,55 the District Court of Appeal, First
District, was called upon to construe section 767.01 of the Florida
Statutes387 in an action arising out of a "bizarre accident" that
381. Id. at 246.
382. Id.
383. 344 So. 2d 313 (Fla..1st Dist. 1977).
384. Id. at 314.
385. 287 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
386. 350 So. 2d 1137 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
387. FLA. STAT. § 767.01 (1975) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 767.01 (1977)). This
19781
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
occurred when a loaded shotgun was accidentally discharged after
the defendant owner placed his large dog in the backseat of a com-
pact automobile where the loaded shotgun was resting..88 Relying on
the statutory language that "[o]wners of dogs shall be liable for
any damage done by their dogs . . . to persons," ' the court rea-
soned that since the defendant was the owner of the dog and the
damage was caused to a person by the dog, the owner is liable for
the damage dorte .31 In so holding, the court recognized that the




In Sapp v. City of Tallahassee,"' an action was brought by an
employee of a motel against her employer and the city for injuries
sustained when she was severely beaten and robbed in the motel in
which she worked. Prior to the beating, officers specially assigned
to the motel observed two suspicious males in the parking area
loitering near the entrance to the motel for approximately ten min-
utes.393 One of the officers observed the men follow the plaintiff into
the motel and, approximately twenty minutes later, emerge run-
ning.
In alleging that the city was negligent, the plaintiff claimed
that the police officers had a special duty to protect her from physi-
cal assaults and that its officers were negligent in failing to investi-
gate the behavior of the men. The trial court dismissed the action.
In affirming the order of the trial court with respect to the City
of Tallahassee, the District Court of Appeal, First District, noted
that "before a municipality may be held liable for the negligence of
its employees, there must be shown the existence of a special duty,
something more than the duty owed to the public generally.""3 4
section is concerned with an owner's liability for damage done by dogs.
388. 350 So. 2d at 1138.
389. FLA. STAT. § 767.01 (1975) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 767.01 (1977)).
390. 350 So. 2d at 1138. The dissent, however, regarded the majority's holding as a
"draconian reading of the statute." The dissent reasoned that where "the damage results
from some physical agency set into motion by a chain of events which may have been
triggered by the presence of the dog, absolute liability should not be imposed." Id. at 1139
(quoting Smith v. Allison, 332 So. 2d 631, 634 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976)).
391. Id. at 1138.
392. 348 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
393. Id. at 364.
394. Id. (emphasis added). See also Gordon v. City of West Palm Beach, 321 So. 2d 78
(Fla. 4th Dist. 1975); Evett v. City of Inverness, 224 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
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Notwithstanding the plaintiff's contention that the police under-
took a special duty to those persons using the rear area of the motel
and that the plaintiff was a person within the class designed to be
protected, the court noted that the plaintiff did not show a violation
of statutory procedures by the police or a direct and personal con-
tact with the plaintiff or that the plaintiff relied upon the city's
police surveillance at the time the incident took place. Citing Riss
v. City of New York,395 the First District noted further that: "[t]his
is not a situation where police authorities undertook a responsi-
bility to particular members of the public, exposing them, without




In Shor v. Paoli,37 the underlying rationale of the Uniform Con-
tribution Among Tortfeasors Act 398 and the common law doctrine of
interspousal immunity forced the Supreme Court of Florida to make
a priority determination between two competing and mutually ex-
clusive alternatives inherent in the certified question. The issue
before the court was whether "the common law doctrine of inter-
spousal immunity control[s] over the Uniform Contribution
Among Joint Tortfeasors Act . . . to prevent one tortfeasor from
seeking a contribution from another tortfeasor when the other tort-
feasor is the spouse of the injured person who received damages from
the first tortfeasor? ' ' 311 In Shor, Mrs. Shor's husband was injured
while riding as a passenger in an automobile driven by her when it
collided with a vehicle driven by Paoli. Although Mrs. Shor was
awarded $12,000 against Paoli, she was found to be thirty-five per-
cent at fault. After satisfying the judgment for the Shors, Paoli and
the other defendant sought contribution from Mrs. Shor as a joint
tortfeasor.
Holding that the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, cor-
rectly answered the certified question in the negative, the supreme
court quoted the Fourth District's reasoning:
The doctrine of family or interspousal immunity is based on the
desirability of the preservation of the family unit. The law of
contribution of joint tortfeasors is meant to apportion the respon-
sibility to pay innocent injured third parties between or among
395. 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1968).
396. 348 So. 2d at 366.
397. 353 So. 2d 825 (Fla.), aff'g 345 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1977).
398. FLA. STAT. § 768.31 (1975) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 768.31 (1977)).
399. 345 So. 2d at 790.
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those causing the injury. In the case at bar it was determined that
both Paoli and Shor caused the injury. Shor's husband collected
100% of his damages from Paoli. To say that Shor does not have
to contribute and account for her wrongdoing would be unfair to
Paoli and a windfall to Shor. . . . This is a case where the joint
tortfeasor sued the joint tortfeasor and we are ruling in support
of that statute. 00
C. State Sovereign Immunity
At issue in Metropolitan Dade County v. Kelly 01 was the ques-
tion of whether a county employee can be held personally liable in
tort for negligent acts committed within the scope of his employ-
ment. The defendant bus driver, relying upon section 768.28(9) of
the Florida Statutes,"2 argued that the complaint failed to state a
cause of action. The District Court of Appeal, First District, held
that since the plaintiff failed to allege that the driver acted in bad
faith, the motion to dismiss should have been granted. In so holding,
the court emphasized that in the absence of any allegation or proof
of bad faith or malicious purpose, the defendants would be immune
from personal liability."'
It should not be overlooked that before the question of immun-
ity or waiver can be properly addressed, it must first be found that
the sovereign body owes a duty which inures to the individual. This
subtle point was raised in Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River
County,"'4 in which a defendant in an automobile accident case
400. Id. (emphasis added). The supreme court noted that its decision overruled Mieure
v. Moore, 330 So. 2d 546 (Fla. lst Dist. 1976), in which the question on appeal was whether
a joint tortfeasor may seek contribution from the other joint tortfeasor who is the spouse and
parent of the injured party. There the court refused to allow contribution since common
liability between Moore and the defendants was lacking.
401. 348 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977). In Kelly, an automobile passenger brought suit
against the owner, the driver and the driver's insurer for injuries sustained in a collision with
a county owned bus. Defendants filed a third party complaint against the county and the
bus driver.
402. FLA. STAT. § 768.28(9) (1975) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 768.28(9) (1977)). This
section deals with waiver of sovereign immunity and reads in pertinent part as follows:
No officer, employee, or agent of the state or its subdivisions shall be held person-
ally liable in tort for any injuries or damages suffered as a result of any act, event,
or omission of action in the scope of his employment or function, unless such offi-
cer, employee, or agent acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a man-
ner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property.
Subject to the monetary limitations set forth in subsection (5), the state shall pay
any monetary judgment which is rendered in a civil action personally against an
officer, employee, or agent of the state which arises as a result of any act, event,
or omission of action within the scope of his employment or function.
Id.
403. 348 So. 2d at 50. See also Pennington v. Serig, 353 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
404. 342 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
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impleaded Indian River County and the State Department of
Transportation for the negligent failure of the county to maintain a
stop sign at a particular intersection and for the failure of the De-
partment of Transportation to paint the word "Stop" on the pave-
ment prior to the entrance of the intersection.
It was urged that section 768.2815 constitutes a total waiver of
sovereign immunity by the state, its agencies and subdivisions in
tort actions and that under section 768.31,408 the county and Depart-
ment of Transportation were liable to a defendant for contribution
or indemnity. The District Court of Appeal, Third District, conven-
iently disposed of those issues by deciding, as an initial matter, that
the thrust of Florida decisions holds that "it is not actionable negli-
gence against an individual that a governmental authority has
failed to maintain a traffic control device at a given time and
place."40 7
XVIII. TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS
It has long been held that in order to establish a prima facie
case of tortious interference with contractual relations, it must be
shown that:
(1) The acts were willful and intentional;
(2) Said acts were calculated to cause damage to the plaintiff in
his or her business;
(3) That the acts were done with the unlawful purpose of causing
damage and loss, without right or justifiable cause on the part of
the defendant (constituting malice); and
(4) That actual damages and loss resulted. ' '
405. FLA. STAT. § 768.28(1) (1977) reads in pertinent part as follows:
(1) In accordance with S. 13, Art. X, State Constitution, the state, for itself and
for its agencies or subdivisions, hereby waives sovereign immunity for liability for
torts, but only to the extent specified in this act. Actions at law against the state
or any of its agencies or subdivisions to recover damages in tort for money dam-
ages against the state or its agencies or subdivisions for injury or loss of property,
personal injury, or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of
any employee of the agency or subdivision while acting within the scope of his
office or employment under circumstances in which the state or such agency or
subdivision, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance
with the general laws of this state, may be prosecuted subject to the limitations
specified in this act.
Id.
406. FLA. STAT. § 768.31 (1975) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 768.31 (1977)). This
section is known as the Florida Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act. See discussion
at notes 312-32 and accompanying text supra.
407. 342 So. 2d at 1049.
408. Bermil Corp. v. Sawyer, 353 So. 2d 579, 585 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977); Reagan v. Davis,
97 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1957).
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In Bermil Corp. v. Sawyer, ' this formula was applied to a
factual context in which a failing debtor agreed to pay a mortgage
broker a $6,000 fee if she could obtain a $60,000 loan for him at an
interest rate of fifteen percent per annum for five years. Despite
substantial difficulty in locating interested lenders, the mortgage
broker finally found a lender willing to deal with the debtor. There-
after, the lender contacted the borrower and told him that he would
not fund the mortgage as promised, but instead suggested that for
the same $60,000, he would buy forty percent of the shopping center.
The net result of the transaction was as follows: The borrower
deeded over a forty percent interest in the shopping center in ex-
change for $60,000 with an option to repurchase at the end of one
year for $100,000. Prior to a pending receivership hearing, $54,000
was paid to satisfy the mortgage default. The lender kept the re-
maining $6,000 which had originally been earmarked as the plain-
tiff's brokerage commission.41
Plaintiff broker subsequently brought suit against the borrower
and lender. After a jury trial, the plaintiff was awarded a favorable
verdict against the borrower for her brokerage commission and
against the lender for tortious interference with the brokerage con-
tract. The District Court of Appeal, Third District, affirmed, not-
withstanding the lender's contention that once a judgment has
been rendered in favor of a broker and against a vendor on a con-
tract action for the price, an action for tortious interference with the
contract cannot be pursued to judgment.
Citing Meade Corp. v. Mason,"' the Third District held that
where a seller and purchaser act in concert to deprive a broker of a
commission pursuant to a contract entered into between the broker
and seller, an action for tortious interference with that contract will
lie against the purchaser, as well as an action for breach of the
brokerage contract against the seller."t 2
It has been noted that "tortious interference with a contract
and tortious interference with a business relationship are basically
the same cause of action. The only material difference appears to
be that in one there is a contract and in the other there is only a
business relationship."" 3 It has been held that a cause of action for
tortious interference with a contractual relationship may be main-
tained notwithstanding the unenforceability of the contract under
409. 353 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
410. Id. at 582.
411. 191 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
412. 353 So. 2d at 585.
413. Smith v. Ocean State Bank, 335 So. 2d 641, 642 (Fla. lst Dist. 1976).
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the statute of frauds.' The same is true where there is a lack of
consideration .4,5
Unlike Bermil Corp. v. Sawyer,"' most of the recent Florida
cases involving tortious interference with economic relationships
have involved what at least appears to be a curious admixture of
both business and contractual relations. Such was the case in Young
v. Pottenger.17 In Young, the plaintiffs entered into a written four
year option to purchase certain real property which was exercised
and communicated to the optionor in writing. The optionors re-
quested that the plaintiffs delay closing on the property since the
optionors were elderly and desired to continue residing on the prop-
erty. The defendants, knowing of the plaintiffs' validly exercised
option to purchase, procured the execution of a deed to the property
from the optionors without explaining to the optionors that they
were conveying their property to the defendants. Based on the
foregoing facts, the District Court of Appeal, Second District, had
little difficulty in holding that the complaint stated a cause of ac-
tion for tortious interference with the plaintiffs' contract to pur-
chase the property. In addition, the court held that since the defen-
dants were not parties to the contract, they were not in a position
to raise the affirmative defense of the statute of frauds in suit
brought against them for tortious interference." '
In Hales v. Ashland Oil, Inc.,'" an action was brought against
Ashland Oil for tortious interference with plaintiffs' advantageous
business relationship with Pickard, from whom plaintiffs had
agreed to purchase 200 trawlers. The plaintiffs also asserted that
they were third party beneficiaries to the agreements between Pick-
ard and Ashland in that Ashland knew or should have known that
Pickard would be induced to procure orders for finished vessels from
persons such as the plaintiffs. At trial, it was held that the plaintiffs'
allegations failed to state a cause of action.'20
Although Florida recognizes a separable and independent tort
of malicious interference with contractual rights and advantageous
414. See Young v. Pottenger, 340 So. 2d 518 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
415. See Chipley v. Atkinson, 23 Fla. 206, 2 So. 934 (1887); Franklin v. Brown, 159 So.
2d 893 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964).
416. 353 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977).
417. 340 So. 2d 518 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
418. Id. at 519.
419. 342 So. 2d 984 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1977), cert. denied, - So. 2d - (Fla. 1978). For a
detailed explanation of the facts in Hales, see Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Pickard, 269 So. 2d 714
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1972), cert. denied, 285 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1973).
420. 342 So. 2d at 986.
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business relationships,42" ' the District Court of Appeal, Third Dis-
trict, emphasized that one important element of the tort is that "in
order to secure an advantage, the defendant, by fraud, [must in-
duce] plaintiff's business associate to act in a way which destroys
plaintiff's business relationship."42 After examining prior case law,
the court observed that in each case the respective defendants
sought to procure a business advantage directly over others, and
noted that it was unable to find a single case which allowed recovery
based on indirect or incidental harm inuring to the plaintiffs' detri-
ment. The court found that plaintiffs had not incurred direct harm
in this case. In affirming the trial court's dismissal, the Third Dis-
trict went on to state that were it to decide otherwise, "the defen-
dants would be subjected to an endless array of suits by persons who
have been indirectly injured by virtue of their dealings with the
party over whom the defendants had sought to gain an advan-
tage."2 3
In Serafino v. Palm Terrace Apartments, Inc. ,424 an action was
brought against a nonprofit corporation charged with the responsi-
bility of approving the transfer of leaseholds in a cooperative apart-
ment complex. The action was based upon the corporation's refusal
to approve the transfer of a leasehold to plaintiff pursuant to a
contract between plaintiff and another lessee. In the subject lease,
a clause pertaining to the conditions of transfer permitted the lessor
corporation to consider the desirability of the prospective transferee
as a criterion for approval. After plaintiffs explained to the lessor's
credentials committee that they were acquiring the apartment for
investment purposes with a view toward renting it to others, it was
determined by the committee that the assignment of the subject
lease to a nonresident owner would not be compatible with the
lifestyle of an apartment complex in which most of the owners were
retirees. 25 The trial court entered a judgment in favor of plaintiffs.
The issue presented on appeal was "whether or not the defendant
...may be held liable to the plaintiffs for intentional interference
with contractual relations when the defendant is acting under a pre-
existing contract between it and [the plaintiff]."426 Acknowledging
that "a contracting party has a justification or privilege to interfere
421. Id. See also Dade Enterprises v. Wometco Theatres, Inc., 119 Fla. 70, 160 So. 2d
209 (1935).
422. 342 So. 2d at 986 (emphasis omitted). See also John B. Reid and Assocs. Inc. v.
Jimenez, 181 So. 2d 575, 577 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
423. 342 So. 2d at 986.
424. 343 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).




where necessary to protect [its] own contractual rights provided
such interference is without malice,"42 the District Court of Appeal,
Second District, following the reasoning articulated by the Ohio
courts, brought the subject matter of privilege into focus by stating:
One who purposefully causes a third person not to enter into or
continue a business relation with another in order to influence the
other's policy in the conduct of his business is privileged if (1) the
actor has an economic interest in the matter with reference to
which he wishes to influence the policy of the other, (2) the de-
sired policy does not illegally restrain competition or otherwise
violate a defined public policy, and (3) the means employed are
not improper.4 28
In the instant case, the Second District reasoned that the les-
sor's interest under the contract was sufficient to give rise to a
privilege to interfere. Thus, under the rule articulated by the court,
it would have been necessary for the prospective transferee to have
pleaded and proven that the lessor, as a third party, acted mali-
ciously in order to have succeeded on a tortious interference
theory .429
XIX. TRESPASS
In Marine Midland Bank-Central v. Cote, 3° the question before
the District Court of Appeal, First District, was "whether the se-
cured party's right to repossess collateral provided by the Florida
UCC in section 679.503 of the Florida Statutes (1975) includes a
right to enter upon private property, or whether the statute simply
authorizes creditors to contract for that right."'' Simply stated, the
427. Id.
428. Id. (quoting Petty v. Dayton Musicians' Ass'n, 153 N.E.2d 218 (Ohio Corn. P1.
1958), aff'd, 153 N.E.2d 223 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958)).
429. 343 So. 2d at 853; Hunter Lyons, Inc. v. Walker, 152 Fla. 61, 11 So. 2d 176 (1942).
The Second District further indicated that since the defendant's actions were exercised for
proper purposes, through appropriate means and without malice, the question of unreasona-
bleness was a matter of contract between the lessor and the defendant. Even if the defen-
dant's actions were unreasonable, they would not give rise to a tort action in favor of a third
party since defendant was privileged to act by proper means to protect its own rights from
being prejudiced by the plaintiffs. See also Babson Bros. Co. v. Allison, 337 So. 2d 848 (Fla.
1st Dist. 1976), discussed in Torts, 1976 Developments in Florida Law, 31 U. MuAm L. REv.
1283, 1292 (1977); W. PROSSER, supra note 8, § 123 at 969.
430. 351 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
431. Id. at 751. FLA. STAT. § 679.503 (1975) (current version of FLA. STAT. § 679.503
(1977)) reads, in pertinent part as follows:
Secured party's right to take possession after default. -Unless otherwise
agreed a secured party has on default the right to take possession of the collateral.
In taking possession a secured party may proceed without judicial process if this
can be done without breach of the peace or may proceed by action. If the security
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precise issue was whether a secured party's rights under the UCC
includes a limited privilege to enter the property of another in order
to repossess collateral. In Marine Midland, a person acting on behalf
of the secured party sought to repossess a vehicle in which the bank
had a security interest by entering the debtor's private property and
removing the vehicle from an open carport.432
Although many of the cases approving entry onto private prop-
erty by a creditor or its agent have been based upon contractual
clauses specifically authorizing entry, the First District noted that
in no case was a creditor found liable in trespass because a security
agreement failed to contain such a clause.433 The court emphasized
that the Supreme Court of Florida had stated, in Northside Motors,
Inc. v. Brinkley,4 ' that section 679.503 "is no more than a codifica-
tion or restatement of a common law right and a contract right
recognized long before the promulgation thereof and creates no new
rights." 3' Following the growing trend toward the establishment of
a limited privilege for creditors suggested by the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts,43 as well as decisions from Florida437 and other juris-
dictions,'36 the First District concluded:
agreement so provides the secured party may require the debtor to assemble the
collateral and make it available to the secured party at a place to be designated
by the secured party which is reasonably convenient to both parties. Without
removal a secured party may render equipment unusable, and may dispose of
collateral on the debtor's premises under a. 679.504.
Id.
432. 351 So. 2d at 751.
433. Id.
434. 282 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 1973).
435. Id. at 622.
436. See RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF ToRS § 183(1) (1965). The underlying rationale of the
section as it pertains to secured parties reads:
c. Repossession by conditional vendor, chattel mortgagee, or lessor. In the ab-
sence of express agreement covering the matter, where goods are sold to a posses-
sor of land under a conditional sale or are made subject to a chattel mortgage,
the possessor's consent to an entry on his land for the purpose of retaking the
goods upon default in payment of the purchase price or an installment thereof is
inferred as one of the terms of the sale or mortgage. The transaction, having been
made in reliance on such consent, creates a privilege to enter and remove the
goods, irrespective of the subsequent withdrawal of the consent. The same is true
where goods are leased and the lessor's right to resume possession of the goods
has accrued.
Id. at Comment c.
437. See Percifield v. State, 93 Fla. 247, 111 So. 519 (1927); Bank of Jasper v. Tuten, 62
Fla. 423, 57 So. 238 (1911); Westchester Nat'l Bank v. Corey, 293 So. 2d 796 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1974).
438. See, e.g., Hollembaek v. Alaska Rural Rehabilitation Corp., 447 P.2d 67 (Alas.
1968); Benschoter v. First Nat'l Bank, 218 Kan. 144, 542 P.2d 1042 (1975), appeal dismissed,
425 U.S. 928 (1976); Gill v. Mercantile Trust Co., 347 S.W.2d 420 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961);
Ikovich v. Silver Bow Motor Car Co., 117 Mont. 268, 157 P.2d 785 (1945); Westerman v.
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Absent a contrary agreement, when a security agreement pro-
vides the secured party has on default the rights and remedies
provided by the UCC, the right of repossession stated by §
679.503 implies, just as it did at common law, a limited privilege
to enter on the debtor's land. The privilege may be exercised only
"without breach of the peace."' 39
XX. CONVERSION
In Porco v. Love,440 an action was brought for the conversion of
land fill which had been deposited on plaintiffs' property pursuant
to an easement between plaintiffs' predecessor and the Central and
Southern Florida Flood Control District. Under the terms of the
easement, plaintiffs' predecessor was to keep all dredged or exca-
vated materials placed upon the land that were not needed for the
Flood Control District's canal excavation project. Several years
after the fill was excavated, a corporation contacted Porco in an
effort to purchase land fill for a development project. Porco then
contacted Werner who advised Porco that he was interested in sell-
ing fill which was located on property along the canal. As compensa-
tion for obtaining the fill, Porco was to collect a purchase price of
twenty-two cents per cubic yard, out of which he and Werner were
to receive six cents each for their labor and services with the balance
going to various landowners on whose land the fill was located."'
Plaintiffs complained that Werner never obtained consent to re-
move the fill from their land. At trial, Porco and Werner were held
liable for conversion of the fill. On appeal, the defendants asserted
that the plaintiffs failed to show that they owned the fill."'
Following Skinner v. Pinney,"3 the District Court of Appeal,
Third District, affirmed the judgment for the plaintiffs. The court
noted that the question of ownership of the fill was not critical to
the plaintiffs' suit since the fill was in their possession while it was
on their property."' The Third District held that the plaintiffs
Oregon Auto. Credit Corp., 168 Or. 216, 122 P.2d 435 (1942); Willis v. Whittle, 92 S.C. 500,
64 S.E. 410 (1908); Morrison v. Galyon Motor Co., 16 Tenn. App. 394, 64 S.W.2d 851 (1932);
Pioneer Fin. & Thrift Co. v. Adams, 426 S.W.2d 317 (Tex. Ct. App. 1968).
439. 351 So. 2d at 752.
440. 340 So. 2d 1245 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
441. Id. at 1246.
442. Id. at 1247.
443. 19 Fla. 42 (1882).
444. 340 So. 2d at 1247. The court also noted that the defendants could not assert
ownership as a defense to the action. For a discussion of the nature of conversion, see W.
PROSSER, supra note 8, § 15, at 93-97. As Prosser points out, the gist of the action is the
interference with one's control of property. Possession rather than ownership is the key to
conversion. This concept is well-settled in Florida. See Star Fruit Co. v. Eagle Lake Growers,
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could, therefore, bring an action for conversion of the fill. "5
XXI. TORT LAW UNDER THE CONSUMER COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT
A case of first impression under the Consumer Collection Prac-
tices Act " ' was presented in Heard v. Mathis."7 The particular sec-
tion of the Act involved prohibits a person from disclosing "to a
person other than the debtor or his family information affecting the
debtor's reputation, whether or not for credit worthiness, with
knowledge or reason to know that the other person does not have a
legitimate business need for the information or that the information
is false."4
The issue presented in Heard was whether a debtor can recover
damages from a creditor who disclosed the existence of a delinquent
indebtedness to a close personal friend of the debtor. Under the facts
presented, a University of Florida student borrowed $200 from
Mathis, an assistant to the University Vice President of Student
Affairs. The loan was oral, unsecured and without interest and was
made with the understanding that the loan would be repaid by the
student when she received an allotment check from her husband.
When the student failed to repay the loan, Mathis contacted several
persons, including one of the debtor's intimate personal friends and
informed him of her indebtedness. Thereafter, Mathis filed a state-
ment of claim against her in the county court. Heard then filed an
answer and counterclaim alleging that Mathis had violated the Con-
sumer Collection Practices Act. At the conclusion of trial, the court
entered final judgment for Mathis, denied Heard's counterclaim
and assessed attorney's fees against Heard in the amount of $400.4
On appeal, Heard alleged that the court erred in entering judg-
ment against her on the counterclaim since the word "family" as
used in the statute could not reasonably be construed to include an
intimate friend with whom the debtor is not living. Additionally,
Heard alleged that the court erred in assessing attorney's fees
against her under the statute' 0 since her claim was neither ill-
founded nor brought for the purposes of harrassment. In response,
Inc., 160 Fla. 130, 33 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1948); Charter Air Center, Inc. v. Miller, 348 So. 2d
614 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1977).
445. 340 So. 2d at 1247.
446. See FiA. STAT. §§ 559.55-.78 (1975) (current version at FLA. STAT. §§ 559.55-.78
(1977)).
447. 344 So. 2d 651 (Fla. lst Dist. 1977).
448. FLA. STAT. § 559.72(5) (1975) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 559.72(5) (1977)).




Mathis reasoned that since the loan was made without interest, the
disclosure of the debt to a person not a member of the debtor's
family was not precluded by the language of the statute.'
Although the District Court of Appeal, First District, agreed
that the creditor's disclosure of the debt to the debtor's friend was
not privileged 52 and rejected the contention that the Act did not
apply to a private individual making an oral, noninterest bearing
loan to a friend, the court, analogizing the debtor's purported cause
of acton to defamation, refused to award damages absent a showing
that the debtor's reputation was adversely affected by the publica-
tion. In so holding, the First District reasoned:
We construe the statute as requiring the debtor to show the fol-
lowing elements necessary for a good cause of action against
Mathis: (1) that there was a disclosure of information to a person
other than a member of debtor's family, (2) that such person does
not have a legitimate business need for the information, and (3)
that such information affected the debtor's reputation.
45 3
Turning to the question of attorney's fees, the court agreed that
the legislature did not intend to make the award of attorney's fees
contingent upon the outcome of the suit.4 ' Applying the test of
probable cause as it is used in actions for malicious prosecution, the
court noted that Heard established all elements of her cause of
451. FLA. STAT. § 559.55(3) (1977) defines the term "creditor" as "any person to whom a
consumer claim is owed, due, or alleged to be owed or due." The term "consumer claim" is
defined in § 559.55(1) as "any obligation for the payment of money or its equivalent arising
out of a transaction wherein credit has been offered or extended to a natural person, and the
money, property, or service which was the subject of the transaction was primarily for per-
sonal, family, or household purposes." The First District refused to accept the interpretation
of the statute urged by Mathis.
452. 344 So. 2d at 654.
453. Id. at 655. The court stated:
An analogy may be made to cases involving defamations which are actionable per
se. General damages are allowed to a plaintiff upon proof of the publication
without regard to any establishment of actual pecuniary loss since damages are
conclusively presumed as a matter of law from the use of words actionable per
se. . . . The reason for the allowance of such damages is that the immediate
tendency of the words is to impair the plaintiff's reputation without regard to
proof of loss. . . . While the Act does not require that plaintiff establish proof of
actual damages less than $500.00, Section 559.77(1), it does require plaintiff to
show the invasion of a legal right.
The court added the following in a footnote as a qualification to its analogy:
Parenthetically, unlike defamations in libel and slander causes which are actiona-
ble per se, and where the courts presume malice from the words used, no such
presumption may be indulged here since the statute does not require the disclo-
sure to be false if made to a person other than the debtor or his family when such
person does not have a legitimate business need for the information.
Id. at 655 n.4.
454. Id. at 656.
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action except a showing that the disclosure affected her reputation.
As a result, the First District refused to find that she acted either
unreasonably or that her claim was ill-founded under the statute
and, therefore, reversed the award of attorney's fees.
In another case decided under the Consumer Collection Prac-
tices Act, the District Court of Appeal, First District, in Story v.
J.M. Fields, Inc.,"' addressed the question of how frequently a cred-
itor. must communicate with a debtor for the creditor's action to
constitute harrassment. 58 Under the facts in Story, the debtor ad-
vised Field's credit manager that he would not make payments on
merchandise until the store had repaired a defective air conditioner
about which the debtor had complained. Thereafter, a representa-
tive telephoned Story almost daily, totaling at least 100 calls over a
five month period." 7 The court found that the calls were not invec-
tive and were made without malice during normal business hours.
Recognizing that the statutory standard is based upon the purpose
as well as the frequency of a creditor's communications, the First
District held that the issue of punitive damages was properly with-
drawn from the jury."8
455. 343 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1977).
456. FLA. STAT. § 559.72(7) (1977) provides that, in collecting consumer claims, no person
shall "[willfully communicate with the debtor or any member of his family with such
frequency as can reasonably be expected to harass the debtor or his family, or willfully engage
in other conduct which can reasonably be expected to abuse or harass the debtor or any
member of his family."
457. Id. at 676.
458. Id. at 677-78.
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